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Affirmative Action in Employment: The Legacy of a
Supreme Court Majority
JOEL L. SELIG*
INTRODUCTION
In the first fifteen years after the enactment of Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act,' the legality and the utility of remedial employment quotas were
widely recognized by the lower federal courts. 2 Numerical goals and timetables3
for the employment of minority groups appeared in various forms: they
were included in court orders to remedy demonstrated violations of Title
* Professor of Law, University of Wyoming. J.D., 1968, A.B., 1965, Harvard University.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982) (prohibiting discrimination in employment), as
amended by Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, §§ 2-11, 13-
14, 86 Stat. 103 (1972).
2. Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019, 3037 & n.28
(1986) (opinion of Brennan, J.); Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561,
612-13 & n.10 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also Schnapper, The Varieties of Numerical
Remedies, 39 STAN. L. REv. 851, 857 n.24 (1987).
3. See Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.17(3)(a)
(1986).
At least in the context of court-ordered relief, the difference between "quotas" and "goals
and timetables," see id. § 1607.17(4), is largely semantic because generally the courts have not
granted relief embodying the more objectionable attributes sometimes associated with the term
"quota."
For example, quota relief does not mean that employers must hire unqualified applicants.
Decrees providing for numerical relief typically define the minimum qualifications for the
positions involved, and although a certain percentage of the persons hired must be members
of the group previously discriminated against, the quota or goal is expressly or impliedly subject
to the availability of qualified minority applicants. See, e.g., United States v. Local 86, Int'l
Ass'n of Ironworkers, 315 F. Supp. 1202, 1245-47 (W.D. Wash. 1970), aff'd, 443 F.2d 544
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971).
Similarly, quota relief is normally stated in terms of a percentage of hires and does not
require anyone to hire unneeded personnel. See, e.g., Arnold v. Ballard, 390 F. Supp. 723,
739 (N.D. Ohio 1975). Moreover, the percentage stated is not a discriminatory cap on minority
hiring; it is a minimum.
As to whether the relief might in some cases require an employer to hire a "less qualified"
applicant ahead of a "better qualified" applicant, the problem is usually more theoretical than
real because there is no valid instrument for "rank-ordering" applicants with sufficient precision
to characterize one qualified person as less qualified than another. See generally Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425-36 (1975) (discriminatory employment tests not shown
to be validated); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (discriminatory education
requirement and employment test not shown to be job-related). Federal agency guidelines
endorsing the use of "goals and timetables" proscribe preferences for minority applicants over
demonstrably better qualified nonminority applicants. See Uniform Guidelines on Employee
Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.17(3)(a), (4) (1986). But see infra text accompanying
notes 280-81.
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VII or other statutory or constitutional prohibitions; 4 in consent decrees
settling lawsuits alleging such violations; 5 in entirely voluntary affirmative
action plans; 6 and in plans adopted by federal contractors subject to Ex-
ecutive Order 11246. 7 The lower courts upheld the statutory and constitu-
tional validity of this kind of affirmative action both in the private sector
and in the public sector, and they afforded district courts and consenting
parties broad discretion in their efforts to fashion such remedies.
Over the years, the Supreme Court regularly denied certiorari in cases
presenting challenges to numerical remedies.8 The Court did not address the
merits of affirmative action in general until 1978, in Regents of University
of California v. Bakke,9 and it did not rule directly on affirmative action
in employment until 1979, in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber.10
In Bakke, five justices endorsed the concept of taking race into account
in medical school admissions, but they were split among themselves, 4-1,
both on the test to be applied to affirmative action programs and on the
constitutionality of the particular program before the Court." In Weber,
five justices, one of whom is no longer on the Court, agreed on both an
opinion and a result upholding an affirmative action plan for skilled craft
training in the steel industry which reserved 50% of certain openings for
blacks. 12
In the following year, 1980, the Court decided Fullilove v. Klutznick.13
Voting 6-3, but without a majority opinion, the Court upheld the consti-
tutionality of a minority business enterprise provision requiring that 10%
of federal funds for local public works projects be set aside and reserved
for minority contractors.
Then in 1984, in Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 14 the Court
considered an order requiring that race override seniority for purposes of
layoffs so that a specified level of black employment could be maintained.
4. See, e.g., Ironworkers, 443 F.2d 544 (Title VII); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315,
327 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972) (42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1982) and fourteenth amendment).
5. See, e.g., EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 556 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied
sub nom. Communications Workers of Am. v. EEOC, 438 U.S. 915 (1978).
6. See, e.g., Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1981).
7. See, e.g., United States v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 169, 457 F.2d 210 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 851 (1972).
8. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 4-7.
9. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
10. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
11. See 438 U.S. at 291, 305, 319-20 (opinion of Powell, J.); id. at 359, 379 (Brennan,
White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part);
id. at 387 & n.7 (opinion of White, J.).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 239-46.
13. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
14. 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
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In striking down the order, the Court held that it was inconsistent with Title
VII's explicit statutory protection of bona fide seniority systems. 5 Certain
dicta in the Court's opinion also suggested that even when seniority rights
are not overridden, quota remedies might inherently exceed the scope of a
court's remedial authority under Title VII.16
In 1986, however, the Court receded from the broader implications of the
Stotts dicta.' 7 In three decisions, the Court addressed statutory and consti-
tutional issues, approving quotas in one case, striking them down in another,
and producing a number of opinions representing different views on various
issues. These cases, discussed below, were Wygant v. Jackson Board of
Education;8 Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' International Association v.
EEOC;9 and Local Number 93, International Association of Firefighters v.
City of Cleveland.20 Although in each of these cases a (different) majority
of justices was able to agree on a result, a prominent labor lawyer could
say with some accuracy:
[Tihere is no single conception of the permissible scope of affirmative
action that commands the respect of five justices. Rather, there appear
to be no fewer than six different viewpoints, and most cases are decided
without a "majority" opinion, the outcome emerging from the confluence
of distinctive viewpoints that happen to overlap on the facts of a par-
ticular case.2'
Nevertheless, despite the lack of a plainly articulated majority position on
some issues, the Court's 1986 decisions cleared the air to a significant degree
and made substantial progress toward an acceptable framework within which
the controversial issues raised by affirmative action in employment could
become manageable. Although the cacophony of contending theories had
not abated in the 1986 opinions, Justice O'Connor perceived "a fair measure
of consensus" among the justices on the constitutional issue in the Wygant
case.22 A similar measure of consensus existed on various statutory issues in
the Sheet Metal Workers and Firefighters cases.23
Justice O'Connor, however, did not join in all aspects of the emerging
consensus,2 and the full implications of her position and of Justice Powell's
15. See infra text accompanying notes 42-56.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 70-77.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 78-85.
18. 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986).
19. 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986).
20. 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986).
21. Gottesman, No Legal Certainty Yet on Affirmative Action, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 11, 1986,
at S-8, col. 1.
22. See Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1853-54 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment); infra text accompanying notes 136-39.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 60-66, 78-85, 101-06, 111-23, 196-209, 219, 222-23,
227.
24. See, e.g., Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3057-62 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); infra text accompanying note 66; infra notes 74, 77, 90, 92, 101
and accompanying text.
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position remained less than clear. It seemed apparent in 1986 that Justice
Powell was the pivotal figure on most of the important constitutional and
statutory issues in this area.2 It was Justice Powell who decided whether to
cast the deciding vote with four justices who were generally supportive of
race-conscious remedies or with three who were not. Therefore, his views
were of paramount importance.
The Court remained closely divided, and its position in any particular
case depended on a fragile and shifting intersection between a middle ground
and two opposing perspectives. This situation simply reflected the facts of
life on the current Court. 26 But in its 1986 decisions, the Court decisively
rejected the extreme positions advocated by the Reagan administration, which
had hoped to deal a death blow to the very concept of affirmative action. 27
After these decisions, it seemed possible that, with some additional fine-
tuning and a reasonably flexible interpretation of the limiting principles he
had articulated, Justice Powell could enable the Court to answer the call
issued in 1979 by another distinguished judge of a somewhat different phil-
osophical orientation:
It is time for the legal community to stop its squabbling: to admit
that the Constitution and the Civil Rights Act permit us to remedy the
wrongs of the past. It is time to abandon the abstractions of "color-
blind" theory and admit that there can be no such thing as a "color-
blind" approach to achieving racial equality. It is time now to concentrate
our efforts on ensuring that the remedies we construct are humane and
effective, that they respect, so much as is possible, the rights of al.8
In 1987, Justice Powell joined with Justice Brennan in meeting this chal-
lenge. The Court decided two cases which substantially clarified the voting
pattern among the justices and further illuminated a working majority po-
sition on major issues. In United States v. Paradise,29 Justice Powell joined
Justice Brennan's opinion upholding court-ordered promotion quotas, and
in Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County,30 Justice Powell
again joined Justice Brennan's opinion upholding a promotion decision that
took sex into account pursuant to an affirmative action plan.
25. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 63-64, 79, 102-06, 122-23, 135, 149-61.
26. See generally L. TIIBE, GOD SAVE Tins HONORABLE COURT: How THE CHOICE OF
StrPEME CoUrT JUsTcEs SHAPES OUR HISTORY 32-34 (1985). See also Selig, Book Review, 21
LAND & WATER L. Rav. 613 (1986) (reviewing L. TRIBE, supra).
27. See Firefighters, 106 S. Ct. at 3071 & n.6, 3073-80; Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct.
at 3031, 3034-52 (opinion of Brennan, J.); id. at 3054 (Powell, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment); Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1848, 1850-52 (opinion of Powell, J.); id.
at 1853-54 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Selig, The
Reagan Justice Department and Civil Rights: What Went Wrong, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 785,
821-29 (1986). See also Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative
Action Debate, 99 HA1v. L. REv. 1327, 1341-45 (1986).
28. Wright, Color-Blind Theories and Color-Conscious Remedies, 47 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 213,
245 (1979) (article by Judge J. Skelly Wright).
29. 107 S. Ct. 1053 (1987).
30. 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987).
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The effect of these developments was extremely significant. It became clear
that Justice Powell's legal position was sufficiently flexible and supportive
of affirmative action in employment to uphold reasonable numerical remedies
in a variety of contexts. 3' With Justice Powell willing and able to join Justice
Brennan's opinions in Paradise and Johnson, both the voting pattern and
the doctrinal basis were established for an emergent five-justice majority in
support of reasonable affirmative action. This majority consisted of Justices
Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens. It was opposed by a
minority consisting of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Scalia.
Justice O'Connor, while attempting to stake out what she perceived as a
middle ground, did not attract support from other justices for her individual
views on statutory issues, and she was in the dissenting minority on the
constitutional issue in Paradise. Justice O'Connor's positions were substan-
tially less flexible and less supportive of affirmative action than Justice
Powell's, placing her closer to the Rehnquist minority than to the Brennan-
Powell majority. Absent a change in the Court's membership, the basic law
in this area had been established and would continue to be enunciated by
the Brennan-Powell majority. 2
31. See infra text accompanying notes 155-61, 252-53, 258-81.
32. The voting patterns of the justices in the cases discussed in the text may be represented
in" tabular form as follows. The justices are listed by seniority in descending order of receptivity
to affirmative action. With the exceptions presently to be noted, the degree of receptivity is
determined simply by counting the justice's votes in the cases in which he or she participated.
These votes, when added together, provide a numerical index of receptivity.
Despite a slightly lower total index, Justice Stevens is placed higher than Justice Powell
because greater weight is given to his present views on constitutional issues as expressed in
Wygant and Paradise, and to his votes in the five most recent cases, than to his votes in Bakke
and Fulfilove. Justice Scalia's placement is based not only on his votes in Paradise and Johnson
but also on assumptions concerning what his votes might have been in other cases based on
his views as expressed in Johnson. It is more difficult to place Justice Stewart based on
assumptions concerning what his votes might have been in the statutory cases; his placement
is based in part on his constitutional views as expressed in Fulliove.
A plus (+) indicates a vote in favor of affirmative action while a minus (-) indicates a
vote opposed to affirmative action. The letters "dnp" indicate that the justice, although a
member of the Court at the time of the decision, did not participate.
4 1-0
04 
.'1' All
Brennan + + + + + + + + + +9
Marshall + + + + + + + + + +9
Blackmun + + + + + + + + + +9
Stevens - dnp - - + + + + + +2
Powell +/- dnp + - - + + + + +3
O'Connor - - - + - + -2
White + + + .- - - -3
Stewart - + - - 1
Burger - - + .- 5
Scalia 
- - -2
Rehnquist . . . . .- - -9
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Justice Powell's retirement could substantially change this situation, per-
haps increasing the significance of Justice O'Connor's views and, of course,
the views of Justice Powell's successor. However, if the justices are faithful
to the concept of stare decisis, the degree of change possible will depend
very much on what has and has not been decided by the existing Supreme
Court precedents. 3 It is therefore of critical importance to analyze the
Court's decisions closely, carefully, and thoroughly.
This Article reviews the current status of affirmative action in employment
in the wake of the Court's 1986 and 1987 decisions. It explores the contours
of the majority views that emerged on various issues, identifying those points
that have been definitively decided and those that remain open to further
development. The Article concludes that the Brennan-Powell majority po-
sition is a legacy that should be preserved. That position recognizes the
values of affirmative action without ignoring the costs. It articulates the
difference between the permissible and the impermissible in a way that gives
generous scope to the exercise of responsible discretion. It wisely resists the
temptation to constitutionalize any inflexible standard of judgment in this
area.
I. THE PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW
There are three contexts in which questions about numerical remedies
arise: litigated court orders, consent decrees, and affirmative action programs
adopted without litigation. Each involves issues of statutory and constitu-
tional significance. The legal principles established by the recent Supreme
Court decisions are best analyzed by considering each of these contexts
separately.
A. Litigated Court Orders
1. Statutory Issues
There are three different sections of Title VII which have required inter-
pretation in connection with court-ordered numerical remedies. These sec-
tions deal with seniority, racial imbalance, and appropriate relief.
a. Section 703(h): Seniority Systems
Section 703(h) of Title VII provides special protection for the operation
of bona fide seniority systems. It declares that if a seniority system was
33. Of course, even if Justice Powell's successor does not consider himself or herself bound
by stare decisis on these issues, it is also possible that the justices who did not accept the
majority position in the 1986 and 1987 cases would consider themselves so bound. This Article
will not speculate on the various possibilities or comment on the likelihood of any justice's,
or prospective justice's, fidelity to stare decisis.
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adopted without an intent to discriminate, then it is not an unlawful em-
ployment practice to award jobs and other benefits on the basis of seniority.14
However, when an employee or applicant for employment has been denied
promotion or hire on a prohibited basis, a court may order that he be offered
the next available vacancy in the position from which he was unlawfully
excluded, and that he be granted retroactive competitive seniority in that
position as of the date of his previous discriminatory rejection. 35 Such an
order is permissible even though it interferes to a limited extent with the
operation of a bona fide seniority system, because it, like back pay,3 6 simply
puts an identified victim of discrimination in the position he would have
occupied in the absence of the unlawful discrimination against him.37 Al-
though this grants the discriminatee a competitive advantage over junior
employees, the advantage is one that he would have had if he had been
treated without discrimination in the first instance. In other words, this
remedy does no more and no less than to make a victim of discrimination
whole by putting him in his rightful place. 3
Such make-whole relief, like the theory behind it, is of course available
only to persons who are proven victims of discrimination. Accordingly, the
Supreme Court has held that even when a general pattern or practice of
discrimination against a class of persons has been proven, it cannot simply
be assumed that each member of the class is entitled to retroactive seniority
relief allowing him to compete with nonminority employees on the basis of
company, rather than departmental, seniority. Although the lower courts
had unanimously indulged that assumption, holding that such relief should
be available on a classwide basis to incumbent minority employees assigned
to segregated departments,3 9 the Court rejected that position in International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States.4° Teamsters articulated standards
for individualized proof to identify those actual victims of discrimination
who are entitled to court-ordered retroactive seniority.4'
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982) states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of
compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant
to a bona fide seniority... system .... provided that such differences are not
the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin ....
Id.
35. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 347-48 (1977); Franks
v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 762-70 (1976).
36. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415-21 (1975).
37. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 347-48; Franks, 424 U.S. at 763-66.
38. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 347-48; Franks, 424 U.S. at 763-66.
39. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 346 n.28. See also id. at 378-80 (Marshall, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
40. Id. at 348-56.
41. Id. at 356-76.
19871
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In the context of court-ordered remedial quotas, the question arises whether
special protection against layoff or demotion may be ordered for the ben-
eficiaries of hiring or promotion quotas when such protection conflicts with
the operation of a bona fide seniority system. The Court did not address
this question directly in Teamsters. Without such protection, the benefits of
remedial employment quotas may be substantially reduced because, in times
of declining employment, minority employees hired or promoted pursuant
to the quotas may be laid off or demoted if they lack sufficient competitive
seniority in their new positions. Those positions would then revert to the
all-white or all-male occupancy which they previously exhibited as a result
of a history of class-based discrimination.
The Court confronted this problem in Firefighters Local Union No. 1784
v. Stotts.42 In Stotts, the lower courts ordered layoffs to be conducted in a
way that would maintain the level of black employment achieved pursuant
to racial hiring quotas, and the result was that white employees with greater
seniority were laid off ahead of black employees with lesser seniority.43 The
Supreme Court held that the lower courts had exceeded their authority under
Title VII by ordering relief that achieved this result.
Although I have previously expressed the view that Stotts was correctly
decided," I recognize that a contrary argument may be made. Such an
argument would focus on the distinction between individual make-whole
relief which is available only to proven victims of discrimination, and class-
based relief, which is not restricted to identified victims. 5 Teamsters, it may
be argued, simply holds that a bona fide seniority system is not itself unlawful
even if it carries forward the effects of pre-Act discrimination, and then
defines the circumstances under which make-whole relief is available to
individual victims of post-Act discrimination. 6 In explaining when such
individual relief is available essentially as a matter of entitlement, 47 Teamsters
does not address a court's discretion to award class-based relief for purposes
other than to put identified victims of discrimination in their rightful place;
such relief might arguably be permissible even if it would affect the operation
of a seniority system that itself is not unlawful. Justice Blackmun emphasized
42. 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
43. Id. at 566-67.
44. See Selig, supra note 27, at 824. Certain dicta in Stotts, as opposed to the holding of
the case, were justly criticized. See, e.g., Daly, Stotts' Denial of Hiring and Promotion Pre-
ferences for Non-Victims: Draining the "Spirit" from Title VII, 14 FoRDAm URBAN L. J. 17
(1986); Fallon & Weiler, Firefighters v. Stotts: Conflicting Models of Racial Justice, 1984 Sup.
CT. REv. 1 (1985). See also infra text accompanying notes 70-77. I share a critical view of
these dicta and have argued against an overbroad reading of them. See Selig, supra note 27,
at 824-26. However, I continue to believe that the decision in the case was correct. See infra
text accompanying notes 51-56.
45. See Stotts, 467 U.S. at 612-14 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
46. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 348-76.
47. Id. at 347-48; Franks, 424 U.S. at 762-70.
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the distinction between make-whole relief and class relief in his dissent in
Stotts,4 8 and Justice Brennan, writing for four justices in Local 28, Sheet
Metal Workers' International Association v. EEOC,49 also emphasized this
distinction. 0
Despite the validity of this distinction, however, it does not follow that
the kind of relief which the Court disapproved in Stotts should be permissible
under Title VII. As Justice Brennan pointed out in Sheet Metal Workers,
the proper understanding of Stotts is that the remedy disapproved in that
case was "tantamount to an award of make-whole relief (in the form of
competitive seniority)" to persons who were not victims of discrimination. 5'
In such a context, the distinction between make-whole relief and class-based
relief was a distinction without a difference: the effect of the racial quota
limiting layoffs of blacks was precisely the same as an award of constructive
seniority credits to black employees. Such make-whole relief to persons who
had suffered no discrimination for which they needed to be made whole
had been rejected by some lower courts long before Stotts.52 Those courts,
like the Supreme Court in Stotts, were correct because such relief is contrary
to the fundamental policy of section 703(h) as that policy was identified and
articulated in Teamsters:
Were it not for § 703(h), the seniority system in this case would seem
to fall under the Griggs rationale. The heart of the system is its allocation
of the choicest jobs, the greatest protection against layoffs, and other
advantages to those employees who have been line drivers for the longest
time. Where, because of the employer's prior intentional discrimination,
the line drivers with the longest tenure are without exception white, the
advantages of the seniority system flow disproportionately to them and
away from Negro and Spanish-sumamed employees who might by now
have enjoyed those advantages had not the employer discriminated before
the passage of the Act. This disproportionate distribution of advantages
does in a very real sense "operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior
discriminatory employment practices." But both the literal terms of
§ 703(h) and the legislative history of Title VII demonstrate that Congress
considered this very effect of many seniority systems and extended a
measure of immunity to them.53
48. 467 U.S. at 612-14 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
49. 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986).
50. Id. at 3048-49 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
51. Id. at 3049 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
52. See, e.g., Watkins v. United Steel Workers of Am., Local No. 2369, 516 F.2d 41 (5th
Cir. 1975); Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. Local Union 327, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers,
508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded for further consideration in light of Franks
sub nom. EEOC v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co., 425 U.S. 987, on remand, 542 F.2d 8
(3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. EEOC, 425 U.S. 998
(1976); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997 (1976).
53. 431 U.S. at 349-50 (emphasis added) (discussing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424 (1971)).
1987]
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In other words, except to the extent necessary to award make-whole relief
to identified victims of post-Act discrimination, the policy of Title VII, as
expressed in section 703(h), is to prohibit courts from diluting seniority rights
created by bona fide seniority systems.5 4 This policy fully applies even when
bona fide seniority rights perpetuate the effects of prior discrimination.
Indeed, the sole purpose of section 703(h) is to protect the exercise of seniority
in precisely that situation; a bona fide seniority system which did not per-
petuate the effects of past discrimination would have no need of a special
definitional subsection (section 703(h)) to establish its legality and viability
under Title VII. The difficulty with relief such as that disapproved in Stotts
is that it undermines, and is inconsistent with, the statutory policy protecting
existing seniority rights. The proper interpretation of Stotts, therefore, is
that it simply holds that "a court may abridge a bona fide seniority system
in fashioning a Title VII remedy only to make victims of ... discrimination
whole . . . . , In ordering quota remedies under Title VII for nonvictims,
a court may not interfere with the operation of a bona fide seniority system.
This limitation applies to layoffs, demotions, promotions, job and shift
assignments, and any other terms or conditions of employment otherwise
determined by competitive seniority under a bona fide seniority system.
5 6
b. Section 7030): Racial Imbalance
Section 7030) of Title VII, like section 703(h), appears in the portion of
the statute defining what is and is not an unlawful employment practice. It
54. An award of make-whole relief to an individual who is not a victim of discrimination
is also inconsistent with section 706(g) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982). Sheet Metal
Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3049 (opinion of Brennan, J.); Stotts, 467 U.S. at 579-80.
Since the relief disapproved in Stotts was "tantamount to an award of make-whole relief
(in the form of competitive seniority)" to nonvictims, it was improper under section 706(g).
Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3049 (opinion of Brennan, J.). This basis for the Stotts
holding was, however, incidental to the primary basis of the decision, section 703(h). Id. at
3048-49 (opinion of Brennan, J.). The Court has rejected the broader implications of Stotts'
discussion of section 706(g). See infra text accompanying notes 70-85.
55. Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3048 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
56. In theory, this limitation on a Title VII court's remedial authority need not necessarily
limit the court's authority under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982), or under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)
and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Section 1981 and section 1983
provide a basis for suit independent of Title VII in cases where purposeful discrimination can
be proved. General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 382-91 (1982)
(section 1981); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
264-68 (1977) (section 1983). Section 1981 applies to both private and public sector defendants,
General Bldg. Contractors, 458 U.S. at 387-88, while section 1983 applies only to public sector
defendants.
It seems likely, however, that the Court would hold that the policy embodied in section
703(h) of Title VII requires a court acting under section 1981 or section 1983 to observe the
same limitation on its remedial authority under those statutes. See, e.g., Chance v. Board of
Examiners of City of New York, 534 F.2d 993, 998 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965
(1977); Watkins, 516 F.2d at 49-50; Waters, 502 F.2d at 1320 n.4.
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is now established, however, that unlike section 703(h), section 7030) does
not place any limitation on remedial employment quotas.
Section 7030) provides that Title VII shall not be interpreted to require
anyone to grant preferential treatment on account of racial or other "im-
balance" in the work force.57 Long before the recent Supreme Court deci-
sions, the courts of appeals had unanimously held that section 7030) in no
way affects a court's ability to order quota relief to remedy proven violations
of Title VII.58 Section 7030), the lower courts had held, merely prohibits
any requirement of preferential treatment to correct racial or other imbal-
ance; it does not address, much less prohibit, preferential treatment to correct
racial or other discrimination.-9
In Sheet Metal Workers, the Supreme Court endorsed this analysis. Justice
Brennan, speaking for four justices, carefully reviewed and explicated the
relevant legislative history that culminated in section 7030). He noted that
Congress made it clear that no one would violate Title VII merely by having
an imbalanced work force, and that a court could not order anyone to adopt
racial preferences merely to correct such an imbalance. He concluded, how-
ever, that Congress in no way suggested in section 7030) (or elsewhere) that
a court could not order preferential relief to remedy past discrimination. 60
"[Tihe use of racial preferences as a remedy for past discrimination simply
was not an issue at the time Title VII [and section 7030) were] being
considered." '6' Accordingly, Justice Brennan rejected "the notion that
§ 7030) somehow qualifies or proscribes a court's authority to order relief
57. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1982) states:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any em-
ployer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management com-
mittee ... to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group
because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or
group on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total
number or percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin employed by any employer, referred or classified for employment by any
employment agency or labor organization, admitted to membership or classified
by any labor organization, or admitted to, or employed in, any apprenticeship
or other training program, in comparison with the total number or percentage of
persons of such race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in any community,
State, section, or other area, or in the available work force in any community,
State, section, or other area.
Id.
58. See, e.g., United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 552-54 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971).
59. See, e.g., NAACP (Boston Chapter) v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1027-28 (1st Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975).
60. Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3038-44 (opinion of Brennan, J.). In United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, the Court had previously held that although section 7030)
states that nothing in Title VII shall be interpreted to require preferential treatment to overcome
racial or other imbalance, it in no way limits voluntary affirmative action including such
preferential treatment. 443 U.S. 193, 204-07 (1979).
61. Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3044 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
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otherwise appropriate under § 706(g) in circumstances where an illegal dis-
criminatory act or practice is established. ' 62
Although Justice Powell did not join Justice Brennan's opinion in Sheet
Metal Workers, his concurring opinion attached no significance to section
7030).63 Justice Powell's opinion in Sheet Metal Workers also explicitly stated
that he was "unpersuaded by petitioners' reliance on the legislative history
of Title VII,"64 and thus he apparently accepted Justice Brennan's conclu-
sions concerning the legislative history and section 7030). In addition, Justice
White's dissenting opinion effectively conceded the correctness of this aspect
of Justice Brennan's analysis. 65 Therefore, although Justice O'Connor dis-
agreed with these six justices on this question,6 it is now settled that section
7030) has no effect on a court's ability to order quotas or other preferential
treatment to remedy proven statutory violations.
c. Section 706(g): Appropriate Relief
In interpreting section 706(g) of Title VII, the section which defines the
scope of a court's remedial powers, the Court has now eliminated the
62. Id. at 3044 n.37 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
63. See id. at 3054 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). See
also Regents of Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 301 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.)
("Such preferences also have been upheld where a legislative or administrative body charged
with the responsibility made determinations of past discrimination by the industries affected,
and fashioned remedies deemed appropriate to rectify the discrimination.").
64. Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3054 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
65. Id. at 3062 (White, J., dissenting) ("I generally agree with Parts I through IV-D of
[Justice Brennan's] opinion.").
66. Id. at 3057-62 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
In Weber, Justice Rehnquist disagreed with the Court's interpretation of section 7030) and
the relevant legislative history in the context of voluntary affirmative action. Compare Weber,
443 U.S. at 227-28, 230-53 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (race-conscious affirmative action is
prohibited by Title VII) with id. at 204-07 (opinion of the Court) (race-conscious affirmative
action is permitted by Title VII). Justice Scalia joined Chief Justice Rehnquist in this view in
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 107 S. Ct. 1442, 1475 (1987) (Scalia,
J., dissenting). However, the issue under section 703(j) is somewhat different in the court order
context, where the question revolves around the statute's use of the phrase "racial imbalance"
rather than its use of the word "require." See Weber, 443 U.S. at 204-07.
Justice Rehnquist relied on section 706(g) rather than section 7030) for his dissenting position
in the court order context. See Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3063 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063,
3085-87 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In addition, in Firefighters he stated that "Section
706(g) is the one section in the entire text of Title VII which deals with the sort of relief which
a court may order in a Title VII case." 106 S. Ct. at 3087 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Therefore, despite his overall interpretation of Title VII's legislative history in Weber and
his position in Sheet Metal Workers and Firefighters that court-ordered quotas are impermissible
under Title VII, Chief Justice Rehnquist has not challenged Justice Brennan's interpretation
of section 703(j) in the court order context. Justice Scalia, who was not a member of the Court
when Sheet Metal Workers and Firefighters were decided, did not address this question in
Johnson, the only Supreme Court case in which he has been presented with an affirmative
action issue in a Title VII context.
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confusion which resulted from its opinion in Stotts. In Sheet Metal Workers,
the Court made it clear that quota relief is available under section 706(g)
in appropriate circumstances.
. The statutory language
Section 706(g), which describes a court's ability to order appropriate relief
upon a finding of unlawful discrimination, appears on its face to be an
extremely broad grant of discretionary authority. Its language includes au-
thorization to "order such affirmative action as may be appropriate . . or
any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate . ". . .67 Section
706(g) also includes a final sentence which, on its face, appears simply to
provide that the court shall not order make-whole relief to any individual
who was denied an employment opportunity for a valid, nondiscriminatory
reason.
6
In view of the apparent breadth and clarity of section 706(g)'s language,
the courts of appeals had uniformly concluded that it supported the avail-
ability of court-ordered quotas as one weapon in the Title VII chancellor's
remedial arsenal. In addition, the courts of appeals did not consider the
final sentence of section 706(g) to have any bearing on this question. 69 That
was the state of the law prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Stotts.
ii. The Stotts confusion
Justice White's opinion for the Court in Stotts substantially muddied the
waters in this area. A portion of that opinion began with an uncontroversial
statement: "Our ruling in Teamsters that a court can award competitive
seniority only when the beneficiary of the award has actually been a victim
of illegal discrimination is consistent with the policy behind § 706(g) of Title
67. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982) states:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is inten-
tionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice .... the court may enjoin
the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order
such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not
limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay ....
or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate .... No order of
the court shall require the admission or reinstatement of an individual as a member
of a union, or the hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as an
employee, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was refused
admission, suspended, or expelled, or was refused employment or advancement
or was suspended or discharged for any reason other than discrimination on
account of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ....
Id.
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Ironworkers, 443 F.2d at 553-54.
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VII .... ",70 The opinion then continued: "That policy, which is to provide
make-whole relief only to those who have been actual victims of illegal
discrimination, was repeatedly expressed . . . during the congressional de-
bates." ' 7' This statement is both unexceptionable and innocuous if it is
interpreted as addressing only the availability of make-whole relief. Justice
White went on, however, to quote certain language from the legislative
history describing the last sentence of section 706(g) and to characterize this
language as making "clear that a court was not authorized to give preferential
treatment to nonvictims." 72 He also quoted other language lending support
to the argument that under no circumstances could a court order quotas
that would benefit persons who were not proven victims of discrimination.73
These juxtapositions in Justice White's opinion rendered ambiguous the
Court's statement that the policy behind section 706(g) "is to provide make-
whole relief only to . . . actual victims of . . . discrimination." Notwith-
standing the position of the word "only," the statement could be interpreted
to mean that the only kind of relief available under section 706(g), other
than a prophylactic injunction, is make-whole relief to actual victims of
discrimination. 74
If this is what Justice White meant to convey in Stotts, it was plainly
unnecessary to the case's result, which is properly understood as based
primarily on section 703(h), not section 706(g). 75 The dissenting opinion in
Stotts pointed out that the portions of the opinion discussing section 706(g)
were dicta, and disagreed with the possible implications of the dicta discussed
above.76 However, three of the justices who joined Justice White's opinion
apparently considered these portions of it to be more than dicta. They
attributed to these portions of the opinion the meaning that Title VII does
not permit any preferential relief whatsoever to nonvictims of discrimina-
tion. 77
iii. The Sheet Metal Workers clarification
In Sheet Metal Workers, six justices-including Justice White, the author
of the Stotts opinion-disclaimed (or receded from) the foregoing interpre-
70. 467 U.S. at 579.
71. Id. at 580.
72. Id. at 581.
73. Id. at 580-82.
74. In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor emphasized that this was her interpretation.
Id. at 587-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[A] court may use its remedial powers . . . only
to prevent future violations and to compensate identified victims of unlawful discrimination.");
id. at 589-90 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The District Court had no authority to order the
Department ... to provide preferential treatment to blacks.").
75. See supra text accompanying notes 34-56. See also supra note 54.
76. Stotts, 467 U.S. at 612-13, 617-20 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
77. See id. at 587-88, 589-90 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoted supra note 74); Sheet
Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3057 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
id. at 3063 (Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J., dissenting); Firefighters, 106 S. Ct. at 3085-
87 (Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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tation. Justice Brennan's opinion for four justices convincingly demonstrated
the incorrectness of such a reading of section 706(g) or any other portion
of Title VII.71 Justice Powell, while not joining Justice Brennan's opinion,
agreed that neither the language nor the legislative history of Title VII
supports the proposition that section 706(g) authorizes preferential relief only
to actual victims of discrimination3 Justice White, while disapproving the
particular relief ordered in the Sheet Metal Workers case, agreed that section
706(g) "does not bar relief for nonvictims in all circumstances," and ex-
pressed his general agreement with Justice Brennan's analysis in support of
that conclusion. 0 Justice O'Connor, who had interpreted Stotts as indicating
otherwise, 81 acknowledged the contrary holding of six justices. She argued
in dissent, however, that section 706(g), while now held not to prohibit
numerical relief in all circumstances, should be read, in conjunction with
section 703(j), to place considerably stricter limits on the availability of such
relief than those expressed in Justice Brennan's plurality opinion or reflected
in Justice Powell's concurrence in affirming the judgment in the Sheet Metal
Workers case. 82 Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, argued
in dissent that section 706(g) absolutely prohibits numerical relief benefitting
nonvictims s3
It is settled, therefore, that Title VII permits numerical relief in some
circumstances, and that section 706(g) does not limit preferential relief to
identified victims of discrimination. The Court has properly rejected a con-
trary interpretation that would "distort the language of § 706(g)"84 and
"frustrate [a] court's ability to enforce Title VII's mandate. 8 5
iv. The statutory standard
Although section 706(g) does not absolutely prohibit non-victim-specific
preferential relief, the Court has not undertaken to define precisely when it
is appropriate to order such relief under Title VII and when it is inappro-
priate. Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in Sheet Metal Workers contains
a fair amount of guidance on this question, without purporting to cover all
possibilities.8 6 However, Justice Powell did not join that portion of Justice
78. Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3034-50 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
79. Id. at 3054 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
80. Id. at 3062 (White, J., dissenting).
81. See supra note 74.
82. Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3058-62 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
83. Id. at 3063 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Firefighters, 106 S. Ct. at 3085-87 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
84. Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3049-50 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
85. Id. at 3044 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
86. Id. at 3034-37, 3044-47, 3050-52 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
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Brennan's opinion, contenting himself instead with the following observation
in the statutory portion of his concurring opinion: "[I]n cases involving
particularly egregious conduct a District Court may fairly conclude that an
injunction alone is insufficient to remedy a proven violation of Title VII.
This is such a case." 87
Since Sheet Metal Workers did involve "particularly egregious" conduct,
including contemptuous refusal to comply with previous court orders,"8 it
was unnecessary for Justice Powell to consider whether quota relief would
be appropriate in less compelling factual circumstances. It would be incorrect,
however, to read Sheet Metal Workers as holding or even suggesting that
such relief may be ordered only in particularly egregious cases. s9 Although
Justice O'Connor9° and Justice White9' made some efforts to characterize
the majority's position in this way, it must be remembered that these justices
were dissenting from the majority's approval of preferential relief even in
the context of the egregious and contemptuous conduct presented by the
record in the Sheet Metal Workers case. The views of these dissenting justices
on the statutory standard for reviewing awards of preferential relief have
been rejected by a majority of the Court and are unpersuasive on their
merits. 92
87. Id. at 3054 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
88. Id. at 3025-31 (opinion of Brennan, J.); id. at 3054 (Powell, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
89. See infra text accompanying notes 93-108, 111-23.
90. Compare Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3058 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("Even assuming... racial hiring goals... are permissible as remedies
for egregious and pervasive violations of Title VII. , . ." (emphasis added)) with id. at 3034
(opinion of Brennan, J.) ("[S]uch relief may be appropriate where an employer... has engaged
in persistent or egregious discrimination, or where necessary to dissipate the lingering effects
of pervasive discrimination."(emphasis added)). See also Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at
3059, 3061 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
91. See Firefighters, 106 S. Ct. at 3082 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White stated:
I . . .agree with Justice BRENNAN's opinion in [Sheet Metal Workers] that in
Title VII cases enjoining discriminatory practices and granting relief only to victims
of past discrimination is the general rule, with relief for non-victims being reserved
for particularly egregious conduct that a District Court concludes cannot be cured
by injunctive relief alone.
Id. See also Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3062 (White, J., dissenting).
92. See infra text accompanying notes 93-108, 111-23.
Justice White dissented in each of the four recent cases where the Court issued rulings
favorable to affirmative action: Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1465; United States v. Paradise, 107
S. Ct. 1053, 1082-83 (1987); Firefighters, 106 S. Ct. at 3081-82; and Sheet Metal Workers, 106
S. Ct. at 3062-63. See also supra note 32. In none of these cases did he articulate or support
a coherent theory of his own with regard to the proper statutory standard for review of court-
ordered numerical relief.
In Sheet Metal Workers, Justice White considered the remedy "inequitable" based on a
reading of the factual record that was inconsistent with the decisions of the district court and
the court of appeals and that was rejected by five justices. Compare Sheet Metal Workers, 106
S. Ct. at 3062-63 (White, J., dissenting) with id. at 3025-31 (opinion of the Court) and id. at
3050-52 (opinion of Brennan, J.) and id. at 3054-57, 3057 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring in part
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Once it is conceded that a court of equity has statutory authorization
under Title VII to grant preferential relief for nonvictims in some circum-
stances, the logical basis for reviewing the court's exercise of its equitable
remedial power would be an abuse of discretion standard. 9 While this may
not be the appropriate constitutional standard of review,9 and while the
constitutional standard will also have to be met in any case where a court
and concurring in the judgment).
In Firefighters, Justice White was the only justice to reach the question of the appropriateness
of the particular relief contained in the consent decree. Concluding without supporting analysis
that the relief was inappropriate, he characterized it as "leapfrogging minorities over senior
and better qualified whites." Firefighters, 106 S. Ct. at 3082 (White, J., dissenting).
In Paradise, which evaluated the relief granted under a constitutional rather than a statutory
standard, Justice White simply noted agreement with much of Justice O'Connor's dissent and
stated: "I find it evident that the District Court exceeded its equitable powers in devising a
remedy in this case." Paradise, 107 S. Ct. at 1082-83 (White, J., dissenting).
Justice O'Connor's dissent on statutory grounds in Sheet Metal Workers made three principal
points. First, her view of the record in the case and the nature of the relief ordered differed
from that of both lower courts and the five-justice majority which affirmed the judgment.
Compare 106 S. Ct. at 3061-62 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) with
id. at 3025-31 (opinion of the Court) and id. at 3050-52 (opinion of Brennan, J.) and id. at
3054-57, 3057 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Second, she argued for a statutory standard based on a reading of section 7030) which six
justices had rejected and no other justice had embraced, see supra text accompanying notes
58-66; supra note 66, combined with a reading of section 706(g) which six justices had rejected,
see supra text accompanying notes 70-85. The standard Justice O'Connor wished to construct
based on these definitively rejected interpretations of the statutory language and legislative
history would emphasize that preferential relief, whether in the form of goals or quotas, should
be ordered "sparingly and only where manifestly necessary." Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct.
at 3061 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This formulation seems more
an expression of an attitude than an articulation of a standard. In any event, Justice O'Connor
did not explain why such an attitude, rather than the usual abuse of discretion standard, see
infra text accompanying notes 93-108, 111-23, should govern review of court-ordered numerical
relief under Title VII.
Finally, Justice O'Connor "would employ a distinction... between [impermissible] 'quotas'
and [permissible] 'goals' in setting standards to inform use by district courts of their remedial
powers under § 706(g) to fashion such relief." Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3060-61
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This distinction is largely of semantic
rather than practical significance. See supra note 3. Although the distinction may be innocuous,
it is not clear why it should be significant in relation to Justice O'Connor's interpretation of
section 706(g) and section 703(j), since "goals" as well as "quotas" provide relief to nonvictims
of discrimination and may involve some degree of preferential treatment. Justice O'Connor
expressed her definition of an impermissible quota as follows: "To hold an employer or union
to achievement of a particular percentage of minority employment or membership, and to do
so regardless of circumstances such as economic conditions or the number of available qualified
minority applicants, is to impose an impermissible quota." Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct.
at 3060 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). So far as I am aware, courts
do not issue such orders, and if they did, the orders would properly be reversed on appeal.
However, Justice O'Connor's concept of an impermissible quota may be considerably broader
than her articulated definition, since she believed the order affirmed in Sheet Metal Workers
met that definition. Id. at 3061-62. As noted above, five justices and the two courts below
held that the order could not fairly be so characterized.
93. Cf. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. at 1076-79 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (abuse of
discretion as constitutional standard).
94. See id. at 1075 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring).
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orders quota remedies, 95 the Court's previous Title VII decisions clearly and
emphatically stand for the proposition that abuse of discretion is the statutory
standard. 96 Section 706(g)'s grant of remedial authority is, after all, phrased
in extremely broad terms: the court "may. . .order such affirmative action
as may be appropriate . . . or any other equitable relief as the court deems
appropriate . . . . ,,97 The legislative history of Title VII also supports an
abuse of discretion standard.98 Of course, the court's discretion must be
exercised in conformity with the purposes of the statute.9 But properly
formulated numerical relief designed to remedy a proven history of discrim-
ination is consistent with those purposes.'0°
Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in Sheet Metal Workers articulated
and applied an abuse of discretion standard. It repeatedly emphasized that
section 706(g) vests the courts with broad discretion to afford the most
complete relief possible to remedy unlawful discrimination. 0 1 Justice Powell,
who did not join this portion of Justice Brennan's opinion, did not attempt
to articulate a statutory standard. 02
Several reasons could explain Justice Powell's forbearance. First, as already
noted, it was unnecessary for him to articulate a statutory standard in Sheet
Metal Workers because the conduct there had been so egregious that the
relief would have been justified under any reasonable standard. Second, in
the court order context, the remedy must also meet the constitutional stan-
95. See Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3052-53 (opinion of Brennan, J.); id. at 3054-
57 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
96. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 364-65, 371-76; Franks, 424 U.S. at 763-64, 770, 779-80; Al-
bemarle, 422 U.S. at 415-16, 419-22, 424-25.
97. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
98. Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3044, 3045-47 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
99. Id. at 3050 (opinion of Brennan, J.); Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 364-65, 367; Franks, 424
U.S. at 764-65, 770, 779; Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 415-25.
100. Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3035-37 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
101. Id. at 3035 (opinion of Brennan, J.) ("The language of § 706(g) plainly expresses
Congress's intent to vest district courts with broad discretion to award 'appropriate' equitable
relief to remedy unlawful discrimination."); id. at 3036 ("In order to foster equal employment
opportunities, Congress gave the lower courts broad power under § 706(g) to fashion 'the most
complete relief possible' to remedy past discrimination."); id. at 3044 (citation omitted) ("Con-
gress deliberately gave the district courts broad authority under Title VII to eliminate 'the last
vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious page in this country's history.' "); id. at 3045
("[The] language [of amended section 706(g)] was intended 'to give the courts wide discretion
exercising their equitable powers to fashion the most complete relief possible.' "); id. at 3047
("Congress reaffirmed the breadth of the court's remedial powers under § 706(g) by adding
language authorizing courts to order 'any other equitable relief as the court deems appropri-
ate.' "); id. at 3050 (citation omitted) ("[Tihe fashioning of 'appropriate' remedies for a
particular Title VII violation invokes the 'equitable discretion of the district courts.' "). Cf.
id. at 3059 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[Tihe plurality ...
prefers to cut the congressional rejection of racial quotas loose from any statutory moorings
and make this policy simply another factor that should inform the remedial discretion of district
courts.").
102. See supra text accompanying notes 87-88.
1
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dard of the equal protection component of the due process clause of the
fifth amendment.103 Justice Powell apparently believed that the proper stat-
utory standard of review was either less stringent than his version of the
proper constitutional standard, or, in any case, no more stringent than the
constitutional standard. 104 From this point of view, Justice Powell may have
considered the statutory standard to be of little significance in this context
because the constitutional standard must also be met in every case. Third,
Justice Powell may well have been in basic agreement with Justice Brennan's
articulation of the statutory standard. Justice Powell previously had ex-
pressed the view that a court exercising its equitable remedial powers under
Title VII is vested with a broad range of discretion.105 In the portion of his
Sheet Metal Workers opinion applying the constitutional standard, Justice
Powell again made reference to the trial court's superior position to make
discretionary remedial judgments. 6 Later, in United States v. Paradise,107
Justice Powell joined Justice Brennan's opinion applying the constitutional
standard in a manner emphasizing the trial court's equitable remedial dis-
cretion. 108
Thus, there is substantial reason to believe that Justice Powell applied an
abuse of discretion standard as the appropriate basis for reviewing court-
103. See infra text accompanying note 145.
104. See Paradise, 107 S. Ct. at 1075 nn.1, 2 (Powell, J., concurring); Johnson, 107 S. Ct.
at 1449-50 n.6 (opinion of the Court, joined by Powell, J.).
If there is a difference between the constitutional and the statutory standard in the court
order context, that difference may be considered anomalous. Be that as it may, the fact that
the Court has not adopted and is unlikely soon to adopt a constitutional standard completely
congruent with the proper statutory standard is no reason to distort the statutory standard.
See also infra text accompanying notes 146-48 (anomaly of applying heightened scrutiny to
court orders remedying discrimination). Cf. infra text accompanying notes 353-57 (anomaly of
applying more permissive standard to voluntary affirmative action than to court-ordered rem-
edies); infra text accompanying notes 374-83 (anomaly of applying different standards to
voluntary action in public and private sectors).
105. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 508 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell
stated:
Although federal courts may not order or approve remedies that exceed the scope
of a constitutional violation, this Court has not required remedial plans to be
limited to the least restrictive means of implementation. We have recognized that
the choice of remedies to redress racial discrimination is "a balancing process
left, within appropriate constitutional or statutory limits, to the sound discretion
of the trial court."
Id. (citations omitted). See also Franks, 424 U.S. at 785-86, 789-90, 794 (Powell, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
106. Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3056 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment) ("[The District Court], having had the parties before it over a period of time,
was in the best position to judge whether an alternative remedy, such as a simple injunction,
would have been effective in ending petitioners' discriminatory practices.").
107. 107 S. Ct. 1053 (1987).
108. Id. at 1072, 1073-74 (opinion of Brennan, J.). See also infra text accompanying notes
157-61, 180-94.
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ordered remedial quotas under Title VII. Nevertheless, since Justice Powell
did not join the portion of Justice Brennan's Sheet Metal Workers opinion
articulating this standard, it may be argued that the statutory standard has
not been definitively settled. A new justice who accepted that argument
would not consider himself or herself bound by stare decisis in this regard.
If the statutory standard is different from the constitutional standard, the
extent of the difference should not be exaggerated. In applying the abuse
of discretion standard under Title VII, a court would examine the same
kinds of factors that are relevant in applying the constitutional standard.- °9
Like the constitutional standard, the abuse of discretion standard does not
sanction the "indiscriminate ' " 10 imposition of quota relief. There must be
a reason for imposing numerical relief, and if the trial court does not
adequately explain the reason, an appellate court may conclude that an abuse
of discretion has occurred. Under the statutory as well as the constitutional
standard, quota remedies must bear a reasonable relationship to the violation
they are designed to correct, and the numbers chosen must also be logically
and factually defensible. A remedy that required an employer to hire un-
qualified or unneeded personnel would no doubt be deemed an abuse of
discretion. Similarly, a remedy that imposed excessively harsh burdens on
nonminority employees or applicants -such as, to take an extreme example,
a requirement that 100% of new hires for a ten-year period be minorities-
also would exceed the bounds of a trial court's discretion.
At the same time, it should be recognized that quota relief is permissible
in a variety of contexts. The range of permissible contexts includes, but is
not limited to, cases such as Sheet Metal Workers where the defendant's
conduct has been so egregious that quota relief is necessary for the pro-
phylactic purpose of assuring nondiscrimination and obedience to court
orders. Justice Brennan's opinion in Sheet Metal Workers noted that al-
though quota relief may be unnecessary "[iun the majority of Title VII
cases,""' it may be appropriate in a number of different situations. For
example, it "may be appropriate where an employer or a labor union has
engaged in persistent or egregious discrimination or where necessary to
dissipate the lingering effects of pervasive discrimination.""12 In some cases,
"requiring recalcitrant employers or unions to hire and to admit qualified
minorities roughly in proportion to the number of qualified minorities in
the work force may be the only effective way to ensure the full enjoyment
of the rights protected by Title VII.' 3 In other cases, even where discrim-
109. See infra text accompanying note 162.
110. Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3057 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
111. Id. at 3050 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
112. Id. at 3034 (opinion of Brennan, J.) (emphasis added).
113. Id. at 3036 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
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ination has ceased, past discrimination and the employer's reputation may
so discourage minority applicants that "affirmative race-conscious relief may
be the only means available 'to assure equality of employment opportuni-
ties .... ' '"14
Justice Brennan also noted:
[A] district court may find it necessary to order interim hiring or pro-
motional goals pending the development of nondiscriminatory hiring or
promotion procedures. In these cases, the use of numerical goals provides
a compromise between two unacceptable alternatives: an outright ban
on hiring or promotions, or continued use of a discriminatory selection
procedure. "'
In addition, race-conscious affirmative action "may be necessary to dissipate
the lingering effects of pervasive discrimination."' 1 6 While racial imbalance
unattributable to past discrimination is not such a lingering effect," 7 im-
balance that is attributable to past discrimination and defective current
procedures is such a lingering effect." 8 "Whether there might be other
circumstances that justify the use of court-ordered affirmative action is a
matter that we need not decide here.""19
The lower courts have approved the use of remedial employment quotas
in a number of different contexts which commentators have categorized in
various ways. 20 Justice Brennan, writing for four justices in Sheet Metal
Workers, cited many of the lower court decisions with approval, 2' and
Justice Powell has also cited several of these cases with approval.' 22 The
same five justices held in Paradise that the trial courts enjoy a substantial
measure of discretion in designing affirmative attion remedies. The conclu-
sion to be drawn is that the Brennan-Powell majority has endorsed the use
of properly constructed numerical remedies in appropriate cases, and has
not limited this endorsement to the most egregious situations. Unless and
until the Court holds otherwise, it should be assumed that court-ordered
114. Id. at 3036-37 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
115. Id. at 3037 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
116. Id. at 3050 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
117. Cf. id. (opinion of Brennan, J.) ("[Rlace-conscious affirmative measures [should] not
be invoked simply to create a racially balanced work force.").
118. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. at 1065-66, 1066 n.20 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
119. Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3050 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
120. See, e.g., Schnapper, supra note 2, at 876, 883, 889, 893, 901, 910 ("compliance orders;"
"procedure neutralization orders;" "test neutralization orders;" "victim identification orders;"
"indirect victim orders;" "deterrence orders"); Spiegelman, Court-Ordered Hiring Quotas After
Stotts: A Narrative on the Role of the Moralities of the Web and the Ladder in Employment
Discrimination Doctrine, 20 HAtv. C.R.-C.L. L. Ray. 339, 365, 370, 384-86, 387 (1985) ("group
compensation;" "making victims whole;" "compliance remedies"-"the interim quota" and
"the preventive quota;" "reparative injunctions").
121. Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3036-37 & n.28, 3045, 3046-47 & n.41, 3050 n.47
(opinion of Brennan, J.).
122. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 510-11 (Powell, J., concurring).
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numerical remedies are lawful if they meet the statutory abuse of discretion
standard and the constitutional standard presently to be discussed. In ex-
ercising its discretion, "a court should consider whether affirmative action
is necessary to remedy past discrimination in a particular case before imposing
such measures, and . . . the court should also take care to tailor its orders
to fit the nature of the violation it seeks to correct."''
2. Constitutional Issues
In addition to the statutory issues discussed above, the Court has been
required to face the question of the constitutionality of court-ordered quotas.
The issues here revolve around the level of constitutional scrutiny to be
applied to such remedies and their justifications, and the degree to which
such orders must be "narrowly tailored."
a. Heightened Scrutiny
The Supreme Court has never definitively settled on a standard for re-
viewing the constitutionality of race-conscious affirmative action. Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun maintain that the remedial use of race
is permissible if it is "substantially related" to achievement of "important
governmental objectives."' 24 Justices Powell and O'Connor maintain that a
remedial racial classification must be "narrowly tailored" to achieve a "com-
pelling governmental interest."' 21 Justice White has subscribed both to the
Brennan-Marshall-Blackmun test, which he co-authored, 2 and to the notion
of "strict scrutiny."' 127 Justice Rehnquist, who with Justice Stewart was the
only justice to assert that race-conscious affirmative action is presumptively
invalid in all circumstances, 28 subsequently appeared to subscribe to the
Powell test. However, Justice Rehnquist's apparent acceptance of the Powell
test occurred in a case in which the test was applied to find an affirmative
123. Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3050 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
124. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. at 1064 n.17 (opinion of Brennan, J.); Sheet Metal Workers, 106
S. Ct. at 3052 (opinion of Brennan, J.); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842,
1861 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring in
the judgment); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 359 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
125. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. at 1064 n.17 (opinion of Brennan, J.); Sheet Metal Workers, 106
S. Ct. at 3054-55 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842, 1846-47, 1849-51 (opinion of Powell, J.); id. at 1852-
53 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Fullilove, 448 U.S. at
496-98 (Powell, J., concurring); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 299 (opinion of Powell, J.).
126. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 359 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part); id. at 387 (opinion of White, J.).
127. Id. at 291 (opinion of Powell, J.); id. at 387 n.7 (opinion of White, J.).
128. Fuilove, 448 U.S. at 522-27, 531-32 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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action program unconstitutional. 2 9 Chief Justice Burger also subscribed to
the Powell test. 30 Justice Stevens has articulated different standards in dif-
ferent contexts. In one instance he disapproved a racial classification that a
majority of the Court approved,'3 ' while in other instances he voted with
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun to uphold affirmative action.3 2
Justice Scalia has not expressed himself individually on the issue. In the
only case where he faced the issue, he joined Justice O'Connor's opinion
dissenting from approval of race-conscious relief and purporting to apply
the Powell test, but reaching a conclusion different from that reached by
Justice Powell. 3 In no case has one theoretical formulation of the controlling
standard garnered the adherence of a five-justice majority.
In sorting out the foregoing configurations, and leaving Justice Stewart
and Chief Justice Burger out of the analysis, the following conclusions of
prospective significance emerge. Three justices are committed to the Brennan-
Marshall-Blackmun standard, and Justice Stevens is committed to a standard
that is in most instances more permissive than that standard. Two justices,
Powell and O'Connor, are committed to the Powell standard, and two other
justices, Rehnquist and Scalia, are apparently committed to that standard.
Three of these four, however, have understood and applied that standard
more strictly than Justice Powell. 134 Justice White has supported both stan-
dards, but he has consistently voted against affirmative action in employment
in the recent cases. Therefore, on the Court as constituted before Justice
Powell's retirement, race-conscious affirmative action in employment (other
than purely private affirmative action, which is not subject to constitutional
constraints) had to meet Justice Powell's standard, as applied by Justice
Powell, in order to survive constitutional scrutiny. 35
129. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1846-47, 1849-51 (opinion of Powell, J.).
130. Id.
131. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 532-54 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
132. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. at 1076-79 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); Sheet Metal
Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3052-53 (opinion of Brennan, J.); Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1867-71
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
133. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. at 1080-82 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
134. Compare Paradise, 107 S. Ct. at 1080-82 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (court-ordered
promotion quota does not satisfy Powell standard) with id. at 1066-74 (opinion of Brennan,
J.) (court-ordered promotion quota does satisfy Powell standard) and id. at 1074-76 (Powell,
J., concurring) (court-ordered promotion quota does satisfy Powell standard). See also infra
text accompanying notes 159-61, 187-94.
135. The Court has not yet addressed the question of the constitutional standard applicable
in the context of gender-conscious affirmative action in employment. No constitutional issue
was raised in Johnson. 107 S. Ct. at 1446 n.2.
Gender discrimination (whether against women or against men), unlike race discrimination,
has not been held to be subject to strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976) ("[C]lassifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives."). The Craig articulation of an inter-
mediate standard for review of gender discrimination is identical to the Brennan-Marshall-
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The theoretical differences between the Brennan-Marshall-Blackmun test
and the Powell test should not be exaggerated. Both call for a form of
heightened scrutiny of racially preferential affirmative action. 13 6 As Justice
O'Connor has noted, "the distinction between a 'compelling' and an 'im-
portant' governmental purpose may be a negligible one."'13 7 Moreover, it is
established that "remedying past or present racial discrimination by a state
actor is a sufficiently weighty state interest to warrant the remedial use of
a carefully constructed affirmative action program,"' 13 8 and that the bene-
ficiaries of such a program may include persons who are not themselves
identified victims of discrimination. 3 9
With this much definitively settled, the manner in which the constitutional
standard is applied is much more important than the theoretical formulation
of the standard."40 In the context of court-ordered numerical relief in par-
ticular, it is clear that the governmental interest in overcoming a proven
history of discrimination is a sufficient predicate for such relief against either
a public sector or a private sector defendant.' 4' In addition, it is clearly
permissible for the relief to benefit nonvictims.142 The crucial remaining
Blackmun standard for review of race-conscious affirmative action. See supra note 124 and
accompanying text.
The potential ironies of applying a more stringent standard to race-conscious affirmative
action than to gender discrimination or to gender-conscious affirmative action have not escaped
the notice of commentators. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AmEICAN CoNsrrrurnoNA LAw 91-92 (Supp.
1979). Tribe states:
[I]t is disturbing that, while the Court has not applied strict scrutiny to discrim-
ination against women, against the young, or against aliens, Justice Powell was
willing [in Bakke] to apply such scrutiny on behalf of a white male who not
merely vicariously but individually had enjoyed a full measure of "power, au-
thority, and goods."
Id. at 92 (footnotes omitted). See also Wright, supra note 28, at 219 ("Since the 'depressed
condition' of minority persons in the United States is more intractable, and arguably more
severe and politically divisive, than that of women, what supports the proposition that it is
legitimate to help the latter, but not the former, to overcome past discrimination?"); Lamber,
Observations on the Supreme Court's Recent Affirmative Action Cases, 62 IND. L.J. 243, 259
(1987). See also generally L. TRmE, supra, at 1043-52, 1063-70 (1978).
136. See, e.g., Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1846 (opinion of Powell, J.); id. at 1852-53 (O'Connor,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 1861 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Cf. id. at 1868-71 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (evaluating legitimacy of governmental purpose and
harm to white teachers).
137. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1853 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
138. Id.
139. See id.
140. See id.; infra text accompanying notes 149-61, 163-95. Cf. Days, Fullilove, 96 YALE
L.J. 453, 467-68 (1987) (perceiving discrepancies between articulated standards and standards
actually applied).
141. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. at 1064-74 (opinion of Brennan, J.); id. at 1076-79 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment); Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3052-53 (opinion of Brennan,
J.); id. at 3055-57 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
142. See id.; supra note 139. See also supra text accompanying notes 78-95 (relief for
nonvictims permissible under Title VII).
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battleground is the interpretation of the requirement in the Powell test that
the affirmative action be narrowly tailored to the governmental interest it
is designed to serve. 43 On this central issue, it is of paramount significance
that the five-justice Brennan-Powell majority that emerged last term agreed
on a flexible application of the Powell standard.'"
Before discussing that important development, a preliminary question con-
cerning the constitutional standard in the context of court-ordered remedies
must be addressed. That question is why any form of heightened constitu-
tional scrutiny should be applicable at all in this context.
Federal court orders, unlike voluntary affirmative action programs by
state agencies, are not state action under the fourteenth amendment. That
amendment's limitations, therefore, are simply inapplicable in this context.
However, federal court orders do constitute governmental action subject to
the strictures of the equal protection component of the due process clause
of the fifth amendment. The Court has assumed that such orders, whether
issued against private sector or public sector defendants, are to be scrutinized
under the same standard as state action establishing racial classifications. 45
The correctness of this assumption is not self-evident, because the federal
court orders in question are issued for the purpose of remedying proven
constitutional or statutory violations. In Paradise, Justice Stevens argued
forcefully and persuasively that it is anomalous for a federal court's equitable
remedial discretion in such cases to be reviewed under a test that requires
the court's orders to be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling govern-
mental interest.'" As Justice Stevens pointed out, "The notion that this
Court should craft special and narrow rules for reviewing judicial decrees
in racial discrimination cases was soundly rejected in Swann. " 47
In Justice Stevens' view, an employment discrimination case in which a
judge orders a quota remedy does not differ from other cases involving
equitable remedies for violations of constitutional (or, presumably, statutory)
rights: the proper standard for review of such a remedy is whether the judge
abused his discretion. 4 This conclusion seems correct. Be that as it may,
the Court has not accepted Justice Stevens' contention that close scrutiny
is inappropriate in the court order context. Rather, it is settled that court-
143. See Wygant 106 S. Ct. at 1853 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
144. See infra text accompanying notes 149-61, 163-95.
145. See Paradise, 107 S. Ct. at 1064 (opinion of Brennan, J.); id. at 1076 (Powell, J.,
concurring); id. at 1080 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3052-
53 (opinion of Brennan, J.); id. at 3054-57 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
146. 107 S. Ct. at 1076-77 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
147. Id. at 1077 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (discussing Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971)).
148. Id. at 1079 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
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ordered quota relief is subject to some form of heightened constitutional
scrutiny.
b. Tailoring
Given the lack of a five-justice majority for the Brennan-Marshall-Black-
mun formula describing their heightened scrutiny test, the controlling ques-
tion is the meaning of the Powell formula's requirement that the court's
order be narrowly tailored to the remedial purpose it is designed to serve.
Prior to the Sheet Metal Workers and Paradise cases, Justice Powell's
pronouncements on this question were ambiguous.
In upholding a minority business enterprise set-aside in Fullilove v. Klutz-
nick, 149 Justice Powell emphasized that the Constitution vests both the federal
courts and the Congress with substantial discretion in choosing remedies to
redress racial discrimination. 50 He noted that the Court "has not required
remedial plans to be limited to the least restrictive means of implementa-
tion.'' In articulating a standard of judicial review, he declared that "[c]ourts
must be sensitive to the possibility that less intrusive means might serve the
compelling state interest equally as well. I believe that Congress' choice of
a remedy should be upheld, however, if the means selected are equitable
and reasonably necessary to the redress of identified discrimination. 15 2
In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,153 Justice Powell's opinion
striking down an affirmative action plan included an ambiguous footnote
that could be read to call into question the foregoing statements in Fullilove.
This footnote stated that "[tihe term 'narrowly tailored' . . . has acquired
a secondary meaning. ... [T]he term may be used to require consideration
whether lawful alternative and less restrictive means could have been used.
Or. . .the classification at issue must :fit' with greater precision than any
alternative means. "' 54
In upholding the numerical relief ordered in Sheet Metal Workers, Justice
Powell did not repeat or advert to the language in Wygant italicized in the
preceding paragraph. 55 In upholding the relief ordered in Paradise, Justice
Powell joined Justice Brennan's opinion, which reiterated Justice Powell's
language in Fullilove:
Nor have we in all situations "required remedial plans to be limited
to the least restrictive means of implementation. We have recognized that
149. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
150. Id. at 508-10 (Powell, J., concurring).
151. Id. at 508 (Powell, J., concurring).
152. Id. at 510 (Powell, J., concurring).
153. 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986).
154. Id. at 1850 n.6 (opinion of Powell, J.) (emphasis added).
155. See Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3054-57 (Powell, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
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the choice of remedies to redress racial discrimination is 'a balancing
process left, within appropriate constitutional or statutory limits, to the
sound discretion of the trial court.' ,156
Similarly, in Paradise Justice Powell also subscribed to Justice Jackson's
oft-quoted paean to equitable remedial discretion: "The framing of decrees
should take place in the District rather than in Appellate Courts. They are
invested with large discretion to model their judgments to the exigencies of
the particular case.'
1 5 7
Justice Powell's actions in Sheet Metal Workers and Paradise-in both
cases over the dissents of the justices who are less receptive to affirmative
action-have removed any ambiguity created by his opinion in Wygant. The
Brennan-Powell majority has established that the "narrowly tailored" prong
of the Powell constitutional test is to be interpreted flexibly. 5 ' Indeed, the
dissenters in Paradise challenged the majority on precisely this point: "The
Court today purports to apply strict scrutiny, and concludes that the order
in this case was narrowly tailored for its remedial purpose. Because the
Court adopts a standardless view of 'narrowly tailored' far less stringent
than that required by strict scrutiny, I dissent."' 5 9 According to the dissenters,
"to survive strict scrutiny, the District Court order must fit with greater
precision than any alternative remedy."' 16
It is clear, therefore, that the five-justice Brennan-Powell majority has
decisively rejected the stringent view of the tailoring concept advanced by
Justice O'Connor and subscribed to by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia. Although the Brennan-Powell majority has not agreed on whether
the Brennan-Marshall-Blackmun test or the Powell test is the appropriate
theoretical formulation, it has agreed upon and emphasized two points: the
Powell test must not be applied to make constitutional review of racial
classifications " 'strict' in theory and fatal in fact,' ' 16 1 and the test leaves
room for substantial discretion in the design of numerical remedies. This
convergence of views greatly reduces the significance of the difference in the
phrasing of the two contending tests. It should now be regarded as settled
by Paradise that the appropriate interpretation of the Powell test is the
flexible interpretation articulated by the Brennan-Powell majority, not the
more restrictive one adopted by the dissenting justices.
156. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. at 1073 (opinion of Brennan, J.) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
157. Id. at 1074 n.34 (opinion of Brennan, J.) (quoting International Salt Co. v. United
States, 332 U.S. 392, 400-01 (1947)).
158. Since Justice Stevens would apply a test that is more permissive than the Powell test,
see supra text accompanying notes 146-48, it follows afortiori that he would favor the most
flexible application of the Powell test.
159. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. at 1080 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 1081 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 1064 n.17 (citations omitted) (opinion of Brennan, J.).
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Various factors are taken into account in judging the acceptability of
court-ordered numerical remedies and determining whether they are suffi-
ciently narrowly tailored. Here again there is a convergence both of theo-
retical views and of practical application among the members of the Brennan-
Powell majority. Under all three legal standards previously discussed-the
abuse of discretion standard under Title VII, the Brennan-Marshall-Black-
mun constitutional test, and the Powell constitutional test-the same factors
are considered:
In determining whether race-conscious remedies are appropriate, we
look to several factors, including the necessity for the relief and the
efficacy of alternative remedies[;] the flexibility and duration of the relief,
including the availability of waiver provisions; the relationship of the
numerical goals to the relevant labor market; and the impact of the relief
on the rights of third parties. 62
c. Applying the Constitutional Standard to Court Orders
The Court applied the factors mentioned above in two cases involving
court-ordered numerical remedies. In Sheet Metal Workers, the Brennan-
Powell majority approved an order establishing a goal of 29% nonwhite
union membership to be met within a specified time period. The order also
required the defendants to contribute to a special employment, training,
education and recruitment fund to be used to increase nonwhite membership
in the union and its apprenticeship program. 63 In Paradise, the same majority
approved an order that, subject to the availability of qualified black can-
didates, required at least 50% of those promoted to each higher-than-entry-
level rank in the Alabama Department of Public Safety to be black. The
order was to remain in force until either the rank was 25% black or the
Department had developed and implemented a promotion plan for the rank
that had no adverse racial impact. 6" In both cases, the majority considered
the factors mentioned above and concluded that the orders in question were
narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling interests of remedying past
discrimination and ensuring obedience to federal court orders.165
162. Id. at 1067 (opinion of Brennan, J.). Accord, id. at 1075 (Powell, J., concurring); Sheet
Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3050-53 (opinion of Brennan, J.); id. at 3055-57 (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
163. Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3029-31 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
164. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. at 1062-64 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
165. Id. at 1064-74 (opinion of Brennan, J.); id. at 1074-77 (Powell, J., concurring); Sheet
Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3052-53 (opinion of Brennan, J.); id. at 3054-57 (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Cf. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. at 1076-79 (Stevens,
J., concurring in the judgment) (not applying "narrowly tailored" criterion).
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i. Sheet Metal Workers
In Sheet Metal Workers, the Court held that the orders in question were
necessary to remedy pervasive and egregious discrimination, and to vindicate
the interest in obtaining compliance by recalcitrant defendants with other
aspects of the district court's orders. The Court also held that the quota
relief was necessary to combat the lingering effects of past discrimination.
The Court noted that these lingering effects included the lack of a number
of nonwhite workers sufficiently substantial to make the system of employ-
ment through informal contacts nondiscriminatory and to negate the deter-
rent effect of the union's reputation for discrimination.'6 As to the availability
of alternative remedies, the Court held that the defendants' egregious and
contumacious history of discriminatory actions and disobedience to court
orders rendered the efficacy of less drastic relief highly questionable. 167
The Court found the membership goal to be sufficiently flexible because
it was subject to the availability of qualified nonwhite applicants and ame-
nable to revision in light of changed economic circumstances. In the Court's
view, the goal could not accurately be characterized as an excessively strict
racial quota.' 68 Justices White and O'Connor disagreed with the majority
on this point, contending that compliance with the goal would necessarily
entail the displacement of incumbent white journeymen by minority ap-
prentices. 169 However, Justice Powell specifically noted that such displace-
ment had not occurred and that if it did occur in the future, the defendants
would be free to argue for relief from the goal's requirements. 70 The mem-
bership goal, which coincided with the percentage of nonwhites in the avail-
able labor force, was appropriately calculated.' 7' The relief was sufficiently
temporary since the preference for nonwhites would end as soon as the
percentage of minority union members approximated the percentage of mi-
norities in the local labor force. Therefore, the orders simply would remedy
past discrimination, without attempting to maintain racial balance after it
had been achieved.' 72
166. Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3050-53 (opinion of Brennan, J.); id. at 3054-57
(Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
167. Id. at 3050-51, 3053 (opinion of Brennan, J.); id. at 3055-56 (Powell, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment).
168. Id. at 3051 (opinion of Brennan, J.); id. at 3056 (Powell, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
169. Id. at 3061-62 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 3062-
63 (White, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 3057 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
171. Id. at 3056 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Cf. id. at
3031-32 (opinion of Brennan, J.) (also noting that the correctness of the original 29% goal
was not an issue properly before the Court).
172. Id. at 3052 (opinion of Brennan, J.); id. at 3056 (Powell, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
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Finally, the relief's impact on innocent third parties was not unacceptably
severe even if, as Justice O'Connor contended, it would "spawn a sharp
curtailment in the opportunities of nonminorities to be admitted to the
apprenticeship program."' 7 3 Justice Brennan noted that the order "did not
require any member of the union to be laid off, and did not discriminate
against existing union members."' 74 He considered it significant that although
whites "may be denied benefits extended to their nonwhite counterparts, the
court's orders do not stand as an absolute bar to such individuals; indeed,
a majority of new union members have been white."'"7 Justice Powell pointed
out that the case was "distinguishable from Wygant where . . . 'layoffs
impose[d] the entire burden of achieving racial equality on particular indi-
viduals, often resulting in serious disruption of their lives.' ",176 As he ex-
plained, " '[i]n cases involving valid hiring goals, the burden to be borne
by individuals is diffused to a considerable extent among society generally.
Though hiring goals may burden some innocent individuals, they simply do
not impose the same kind of injury that layoffs impose.' ",,7
ii. Paradise
In Paradise, for the reason previously explained, Justice Stevens did not
apply the Powell test.' 7 He simply noted his conclusion that the district
court had not abused its discretion in shaping the quota remedy. 7 9 The
remainder of the Brennan-Powell majority reviewed the 50-50 promotion
order in light of each of the relevant factors. Those justices held that the
order was necessary to remedy past discrimination and its continuing effects,
which included "a departmental hierarchy dominated exclusively by non-
minorities." "s ° Furthermore, the order was necessary to enable the Depart-
ment to make promotions during the interim period in which a valid,
nondiscriminatory procedure without adverse racial impact was being de-
veloped.' 8' The remedy was also supported by the interest in securing com-
pliance with the court's prior orders. 8 2 Despite a vigorous dissent complaining
of inadequate consideration of possible alternative remedies,' 3 the majority
173. Id. at 3062 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
174. Id. at 3052 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 3057 (citation omitted) (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
177. Id. For a further discussion of the differences between layoffs and other burdens on
nonminorities, see infra text accompanying notes 327-37.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 146-48.
179. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. at 1079 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
180. Id. at 1065 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
181. Id. at 1069 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
182. Id. at 1066 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
183. Id. at 1081-82 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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emphasized that the trial court had substantial discretion in selecting ap-
propriate remedies and was not limited to the least restrictive means avail-
able.'1
The promotion order in Paradise was sufficiently flexible for two reasons.
First, it was subject to the availability of qualified black candidates. Second,
it was sufficiently temporary because the quota provision would end either
when the rank in question had attained the same percentage of blacks as
the relevant labor force or when acceptable nondiscriminatory promotion
procedures had been established. 18 5 The 50-50 quota was acceptable even
though the percentage of blacks in the labor force was only 25%; the 50-
50 interim promotion rate merely increased the speed at which the ultimate
25% goal would be attained. 8 6 This approval of "catch-up" or "accelerated"
quota relief, which the lower courts have ordered with some frequency,'1 7
is extremely significant. The approval came over the vigorous objections of
the dissenters, who argued:
The one-for-one promotion quota used in this case far exceeded the
percentage of blacks in the trooper force, and there is no evidence in
the record that such an extreme quota was necessary to eradicate the
effects of the Department's delay. . . . [P]rotection of the rights of
nonminority workers demands that a racial goal not substantially exceed
the percentage of minority group members in the relevant population or
work force absent compelling justification.,'
The Brennan-Powell response on this point was as follows:
Even within the narrow confines of strict scrutiny, there remains the
requirement that the district court not only refrain from ordering relief
that violates the Constitution, but also that it order the relief necessary
to cure past violations and to obtain compliance with its mandate. There
will be cases-this is one-where some accelerated relief is plainly jus-
tified."19
Finally, the promotion order's impact on white employees was acceptable
even though, unlike in a hiring case, the interests of identifiable incumbent
employees were affected. "Because the one-for-one requirement is so limited
in scope and duration, it only postpones the promotions of qualified whites."'190
"To be sure," Justice Brennan explained, "black applicants would receive
some advantage. But this situation is only temporary, and is subject to
amelioration by the action of the Department itself."' 91 Justice Powell noted
184. Id. at 1072, 1073-74 (opinion of Brennan, J.); id. at 1076-79 (Stevens, J., concurring
in the judgment).
185. Id. at 1070-71 (opinion of Brennan, J.); id. at 1076 (Powell, J., concurring).
186. Id. at 1071-72 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
187. See, e.g., Beecher, 504 F.2d at 1026-27.
188. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. at 1081 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 1072 n.32 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
190. Id. at 1073 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
191. Id.
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that "[a]lthough the burden of a narrowly prescribed promotion goal ...
is not diffused among society generally, the burden is shared by the non-
minority employees over a period of time.' ' 92
Again, the dissenters objected that the quota had been imposed "without
first considering the effectiveness of alternatives that would have a lesser
effect on the rights of nonminority troopers."' 93 But unlike the dissenters,
the Court attached weight to the fact that a remedy with a lesser effect on
the rights of nonminority employees would provide correspondingly less relief
for the proven violation of the rights of minorities. Justice Brennan ex-
plained:
It would have been improper for the District Judge to ignore the
effects of the Department's delay and its continued default of its obli-
gation to develop a promotion procedure, and to require only that,
commencing in 1984, the Department promote one black for every three
whites promoted. The figure selected to compensate for past discrimi-
nation and delay necessarily involved a delicate calibration of the rights
and interests of the plaintiff class, the Department, and the white troop-
ers .... This Court should not second-guess the lower court's carefully
considered choice of the figure necessary to achieve its many pur-
poses .... 194
Thus the Court in Paradise emphasized the deference to be accorded to the
trial court's equitable remedial discretion.
iii. Future cases
Paradise and Sheet Metal Workers both presented particularly compelling
factual circumstances for the award of numerical relief: pervasive, long-
standing, egregious patterns of discrimination and recalcitrant foot-dragging
in the face of prior court orders. However, the articulation and application
of the constitutional test in the opinions of the Brennan-Powell majority in
no way suggested that the availability of quota relief is limited to such
aggravated cases. 195 At the same time, the dissenting justices were unwilling,
even in such aggravated circumstances, to approve numerical relief that the
majority judged reasonable, and this underlines the significance of the 5-4
division on the Court in these cases. Nevertheless, the Brennan-Powell ma-
jority has established, at least in the court order context, a constitutional
test of heightened scrutiny that is similar in application and result to the
statutory test embodying an abuse of discretion standard.
192. Id. at 1076 (Powell, J., concurring).
193. Id. at 1082 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 1072 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
195. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 88-89, 93-108, 111-13 (same observation concerning
the statutory test).
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B. Consent Decrees
Consent decrees-judicial orders agreed to by the parties-are a frequent
method of resolving employment discrimination litigation. Many such decrees
provide extensive injunctive relief, including quota remedies.196 In Local
Number 93, International Association of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 197
the Supreme Court considered whether section 706(g) of Title V1 911 precluded
the entry of a consent decree which contained promotion quotas that might
benefit individuals who were not identified victims of discrimination.1 99 The
Court held that, whatever limitations section 706(g) places on a court's ability
to order such relief in contested litigation,200 it in no way limits the relief
that may be afforded in a consent decree. 201
Justice O'Connor and the members of the Brennan-Powell majority joined
Justice Brennan's opinion in this 6-3 decision. In dissent, Justice Rehnquist
argued with some persuasiveness that "an order of the Court entered by the
consent of the parties does not become any less an order of the Court," 20 2
and that the proper scope of a consent decree is limited "to that of imple-
mentation of the federal statute pursuant to which the decree is entered. '20 3
In Justice Rehnquist's view, if section 706(g) would prevent a court from
ordering certain relief in contested litigation, it would also prevent the court
from ordering the same relief with the parties' consent. 2°4
The majority, however, did not consider the issue to be quite so simple
and straightforward. Rather, it saw consent decrees as "hybrid ' 205 instru-
ments embodying not only some of the characteristics of judgments entered
after litigation, but also some of the characteristics of contracts.2 6 After
reviewing the legislative history and the purpose of section 706(g), the Court
held that "consent decrees are not included among the 'orders' referred to
in § 706(g), for the voluntary nature of a consent decree is its most fun-
damental characteristic." Therefore, whatever limits section 706(g) places
on court-imposed quota relief, "[t]he limits on [voluntary agreements pro-
viding for race-conscious remedial action] must be found outside § 706(g)." 208
196. See Schwarzschild, Public Law by Private Bargain: Title VII Consent Decrees and the
Fairness of Negotiated Institutional Reform, 1984 DuICE L.J. 887, 894-901.
197. 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986).
198. See supra note 67.
199. 106 S. Ct. at 3066.
200. The Court discussed those limits in the Sheet Metal Workers case. See supra text
accompanying notes 78-123.
201. Firefighters, 106 S. Ct. at 3076.
202. Id. at 3087 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
203. Id. at 3085 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 3083, 3087 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
205. Id. at 3074.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 3075.
208. Id.
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Three important consequences follow from the Court's analysis. First, "a
federal court is not necessarily barred from entering a consent decree merely
because the decree provides broader relief than the court could have awarded
after a trial." 209 Although section 706(g) permits court-ordered numerical
relief in a variety of situations,210 there are circumstances in which a court
could not order such relief in contested litigation, but could approve the
inclusion of such relief in a consent decree. For example, since the entire
purpose of a consent decree is to arrive at a compromise settlement, the
decree need not be supported by findings or admissions of past discrimi-
nation. Beyond this, the statutory limitations that do apply in the consent
decree or voluntary action situation permit a greater degree of imprecision
in connecting the relief ordered to a history of past discrimination than
would be acceptable in the context of contested litigation; indeed, even
"societal discrimination," as opposed to discrimination by the entity adopt-
ing the affirmative action plan, can provide a sufficient factual predicate. 21'
But the limitations applicable in the consent decree or voluntary action
context are not insignificant. Parties may not agree to a consent decree (nor
may a court approve one) that includes quota remedies and either lacks a
factual predicate or imposes unduly on the interests of nonminorities. 212
The second consequence of the Court's analysis in Firefighters is that, for
the same reason that section 706(g) does not enter into the analysis in the
consent decree context, the equal protection component of the due process
clause of the fifth amendment would seem to be inapplicable to consent
decrees.213 This further differentiates the consent decree situation from con-
tested litigation in which a court orders relief against the defendant. It means
that constitutional limitations apply in the consent decree context only when
the fourteenth amendment is implicated by the involvement of a public sector
defendant. A private sector defendant who agrees to a consent decree may
derive significant additional flexibility from the fact that the decree need
209. Id. at 3077.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 111-23.
211. See infra text accompanying notes 258-67.
212. See infra text accompanying notes 243-45, 275-81.
213. Compare Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3052 (opinion of Brennan, J.) (applying
fifth amendment test) and id. at 3054-57 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (applying fifth amendment test) with Firefighters, 106 S. Ct. at 3075 n.ll, 3077-78,
3080 (no mention of fifth amendment) and id. at 3080 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (no mention
of fifth amendment). See also Firefighters, 106 S. Ct. at 3076. In Firefighters, the Court stated:
[Ilt is the parties' agreement that serves as the source of the court's authority to
enter any judgment at all .... [I]t is the agreement of the parties, rather than
the force of the law upon which the complaint was originally based, that creates
the obligations embodied in a consent decree. ...
... [J]udicial enforcement is available whether race-conscious relief is provided
in a collective bargaining agreement (as in Weber) or in a consent decree; only
the form of that enforcement is different.
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only satisfy the statutory standard for voluntary action, not any constitu-
tional standard. The constitutional standard applied to remedies for an
employer's past discrimination may not be precisely congruent with the
statutory standard for voluntary action. 214 In addition, the constitutional
standard applied to voluntary affirmative action not predicated on an em-
ployer's own past discrimination may be significantly more stringent than
the statutory standard.215
The third consequence of Firefighters is that, again for the same reason
that section 706(g) does not apply to consent decrees, other provisions of
Title VII such as section 7030) and section 703(h) would seem to be inap-
plicable. Although section 703(j) does not in any event limit relief based on
a finding of discrimination in contested litigation, 216 section 703(h) does
significantly limit a court's ability to interfere with seniority rights.2 7 Under
Firefighters, it appears that if an employer and a union agree with a plaintiff
in a Title VII suit to modify existing seniority rights, section 703(h) will not
inhibit their ability to incorporate such relief in a consent decree. This is
true whether or not the seniority system is bona fide and would otherwise
be protected by section 703(h) (a factual question that will normally be
unresolved in the consent decree context). This result is as it should be,
since employers and unions normally are free to agree to modify seniority
rights through collective bargaining, 218 and since there is no reason why
section 703(h) should prevent collectively-bargained modifications from being
included in a consent decree.
This is not to say, however, that there are no limitations on the ability
to modify existing seniority rights or to engage in race-conscious preferential
relief through the mechanism of a consent decree. For example, consent
decrees obviously cannot resolve the claims of parties or intervenors who
do not consent to them.219 A decree to which a company and a union agree
may alter the collectively-bargained seniority system, but a decree to which
only the company agrees obviously cannot bind the union or the persons
whom it represents, nor can it preclude them from having their objections
214. See Firefighters, 106 S. Ct. at 3073 n.8. See also supra text accompanying notes 124-
62; infra text accompanying notes 239-81.
215. See infra text accompanying notes 290-307, 374-83.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 57-66.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 34-56.
218. See, e.g., Franks, 424 U.S. at 778-79.
219. Firefighters, 106 S. Ct. at 3079. The question whether objectors who do not intervene
in a timely fashion may be precluded from a "collateral attack" on a consent decree is an
interesting one. See Schwarzschild, supra note 196, at 922-29. The Court recently reviewed a
case raising this issue but, being equally divided, was unable to resolve the issue. See Marino
v. Ortiz, 806 F.2d 1144 (2d Cir. 1986), aff'd by an equally divided court, 56 U.S.L.W. 4090
(U.S. Jan. 13, 1988). See also Hispanic Soc'y of New York City Police Dep't v. New York
City Police Dep't, 806 F.2d 1147 (2d Cir. 1986), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Marino v. Ortiz,
56 U.S.L.W. 4090 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1988).
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adjudicated if the objections are raised in a timely fashion in an appropriate
forum. Indeed, a company that unilaterally consents to modify a seniority
system without adjudication of the system's lawfulness under Title VII is
potentially subject to damage awards for violation of the collective bargaining
agreement. 22° "Absent a judicial determination, the [Equal Employment Op-
portunity] Commission, not to mention the Company, cannot alter the
collective-bargaining agreement without the Union's consent."''n It is even
conceivable that a company entering into such a consent decree could become
subject to a conflicting injunctive order enforcing the bargaining agreement.
In that event, however, the courts ultimately would have to examine the
merits of the underlying discrimination claim to determine whether the bar-
gaining agreement or Title VII takes precedence.
Moreover, a court order modifying (or refusing to modify) a consent
decree over the objection of one of the parties is subject to the same statutory
and constitutional limitations as any other order in contested litigation.2
In addition, consent decrees themselves are subject to the same statutory
(and, in the public sector, constitutional) objections that may be raised with
regard to contractual agreements or other voluntary actions. 2m The statutory
limits on voluntary affirmative action provided by Title VII's prohibitions
of discrimination, sections 703(a)-(d),2 are discussed below,2 as are the
constitutional limits provided by the fourteenth amendment in the public
sector.226 The effect of Firefighters is simply to mandate that consent decrees
in fair employment litigation be subject to and evaluated in terms of the
same constraints-statutory, constitutional, and contractual-as voluntary
affirmative action programs, and not in terms of whatever additional con-
straints may be applicable to litigated court orders. In this regard, "there
does not seem to be any reason to distinguish between voluntary action
taken in a consent decree and voluntary action taken entirely outside the
context of litigation."227
There are, of course, some respects in which consent decrees are subject
to a form of judicial review different from that applied to voluntary affir-
220. See W. R. Grace and Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of United Rubber Workers
of Am., 461 U.S. 757 (1983).
221. Id. at 771.
222. Firefighters, 106 S. Ct. at 3078-79; Stotts, 467 U.S. at 578 ("The settlement theory...
has no application when there is no 'settlement' with respect to the disputed issue.").
223. See Firefighters, 106 S. Ct. at 3073 n.8, 3075 n.l1, 3077-78, 3080; id. at 3080 (O'Connor,
J., concurring). As noted above, parties to consent decrees or other agreements are also
potentially subject to liability for claims of persons whose contractual rights are adversely
affected. See supra text accompanying notes 219-21; supra notes 219-20.
224. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) to (d) (1982).
225. See infra text accompanying notes 234-81.
226. See infra text accompanying notes 282-337.
227. Firefighters, 106 S. Ct. at 3073 (footnote omitted).
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mative action programs. 2 For example, "a consent decree must spring from
and serve to resolve a dispute within the court's subject-matter jurisdiction.
Furthermore, . . .the consent decree must 'com[e] within the general scope
of the case made by the pleadings,' . . . and must further the objectives of
the law upon which the complaint was based." 229 In addition, in a private
class action the court is required to review any proposed settlement pursuant
to Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure3 °0 A "fairness hearing"
may also be appropriate in other contexts, and interesting questions arise
concerning the proper nature and scope of fairness hearings in cases where
the plaintiff is a private class as well as in cases where the plaintiff is a
government enforcement agency. 23' Firefighters does not purport to address
these questions or other questions that may arise in connection with consent
decrees. 212
C. Voluntary Affirmative Action
1. Statutory Issues
The same sections of Title VII considered in connection with litigated
court orders must also be considered briefly here in connection with voluntary
affirmative action. However, to the extent that Title VII limits voluntary
affirmative action, the limitations are found instead in the basic nondis-
crimination provisions of the statute.
a. Sections 703(h), 703(0), and 706(g):
Seniority Systems, Racial Imbalance, and Appropriate Relief
Voluntary affirmative action programs outside consent decrees, like those
incorporated in consent decrees, are not limited by section 703(h), section
228. See generally Anderson, The Approval and Interpretation of Consent Decrees in Civil
Rights Class Action Litigation, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 579.
229. Firefighters, 106 S. Ct. at 3077 (citations omitted). See, e.g., United States v. City of
Alexandria, 614 F.2d 1358 (5th Cir. 1980) (trial court abused its discretion in refusing to approve
consent decree containing hiring and promotion goals proposed by government and defendants).
230. See, e.g., Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326 (5th Cir. 1977) (trial court did not abuse
its discretion in approving consent decree in private class action over objections of some class
members).
231. See Schwarzschild, supra note 196, at 909-34. See also United States v. City of Jackson,
519 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1975) (trial court properly denied motion by black employees to
intervene in government enforcement action settled by consent decree); United States v. Libbey-
Owens-Ford Co., 3 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 8122 (N.D. Ohio 1971) (overruling objections
of adversely affected male employees to consent decree in government enforcement action,
where government and defendants had agreed to procedure for notice to all employees and
opportunity to present objections) (consent decree reported at 3 EmpI. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
8052 (N.D. Ohio 1971)).
232. This term the Court considered a case raising the "collateral attack" question, but its
disposition of the case lacked precedential significance. See supra note 219.
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703(j),23 or section 706(g) of Title VII. Whatever one's view might be as to
the correctness of the Firefighters decision concerning consent decrees, vol-
untary programs adopted outside the context of litigation are obviously
neither based on a judicial finding of liability nor embodied in a court order.
b. Sections 703(a)-(d): Nondiscrimination
The only basis for attacking voluntary affirmative action under Title VII-
whether or not the affirmative action is contained in a consent decree-is
provided by sections 703(a)-(d). 2 4 These sections define and prohibit unlawful
discrimination by employers, employment agencies, unions, and joint ap-
prenticeship and other training programs. They apply not only to discrim-
ination against minorities and women, but to discrimination against white
persons and men as well. 2 5 A person claiming that he has been or will be
injured by "reverse discrimination" perpetrated because of an affirmative
action program may challenge the program under one of these sections. If
the program is not embodied in a consent decree, the aggrieved person must
file his own suit against the employer or other entity that allegedly discrim-
inated or will be discriminating against him. The defendant may then raise
its affirmative action program as a defense. 236 If the program is embodied
in a consent decree, the aggrieved person may present his challenge by
intervening in the case in which the consent decree is being considered or
has been entered, 237 or he may attempt to pursue his own independent suit
which challenges the action taken pursuant to the consent decree. 238
i. The Weber precedent
The Supreme Court first considered the legality of affirmative action under
sections 703(a)-(d) in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber.29 In Weber,
the Court upheld a collectively-bargained affirmative action plan that re-
served for blacks 50% of the openings in an in-plant craft training program
until the percentage of black craftworkers matched the percentage of blacks
in the local labor force (39%). 2-o The Court held that in light of the legislative
233. Weber held that although section 7030) provides that Title VII shall not be interpreted
to require preferential treatment to overcome racial or other imbalance, Title VII permits
voluntary preferential treatment to overcome such imbalance. See supra note 60. Weber was
reaffirmed in Johnson. See infra text accompanying notes 252-55.
234. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) to (d) (1982).
235. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
236. See Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1449.
237. See, e.g., Hispanic Soc'y, 806 F.2d at 1153-54.
238. If he follows this latter route, he may encounter the defense that he is engaged in an
impermissible collateral attack on the consent decree. See supra note 219.
239. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
240. Weber, 443 U.S. at 197-99.
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history and the purposes of Title VII, the statutory nondiscrimination pro-
visions should not be read literally to prohibit all private, voluntary, race-
conscious affirmative action plans.2' The Court abjured any effort to "define
in detail the line of demarcation between permissible and impermissible
affirmative action plans."2' 2 The plan at issue was held to be permissible
for three reasons: it was "designed to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalance
in traditionally segregated job categories; " 24 it did not "unnecessarily tram-
mel the interests of the white employees;" 2" and it was "a temporary measure
... not intended to maintain racial balance, but simply to eliminate a
manifest racial imbalance." 2
Until last term it was not clear whether a majority of the present Court
was committed to continued adherence to Weber. The five-justice majority
in that case included Justice Stewart, who is no longer on the Court, and
Justice White, who had subsequently raised a question as to the proper
interpretation of the Weber opinion.2" Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice
Burger had dissented in Weber vigorously and at length.2 7 Justices Powell
and Stevens had not participated, 24 and in Bakke, Justice Stevens had
interpreted Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act241 as enacting a colorblind-
ness standard.? 0 Justices O'Connor and Scalia were not on the Court when
Weber was decided. Although there were indications in the 1986 decisions
that Justices Powell, Stevens, and O'Connor accepted Weber as binding
precedent, the indications were not entirely free of ambiguity.'
The positions of the justices were clarified, and Weber was fully reaf-
firmed, in Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cali-
fornia.2" Six justices-the Brennan-Powell majority and Justice O'Connor-
announced their adherence to Weber.25" Justice Stevens explained that stare
decisis impelled him to adhere "without hesitation" to Weber's authoritative
construction of Title VII even though he believed that construction to be
erroneous .2 4 Justice O'Connor, more ambivalently but nevertheless defini-
241. Id. at 200-208.
242. Id. at 208.
243. Id. at 209 (footnote omitted).
244. Id. at 208.
245. Id.
246. Firefighters, 106 S. Ct. at 3081 (White, J., dissenting).
247. 443 U.S. at 219-55.
248. Id. at 209.
249. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982).
250. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 412-18 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
251. See Firefighters, 106 S. Ct. at 3072-73; Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1855 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
252. 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987).
253. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1449-52; id. at 1460-61 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment).
254. Id. at 1458-59 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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tively, announced her adherence to Weber based on stare decisis. 5 In dissent,
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Scalia announced that they
favored overruling WeberY56 The result is that Weber is firmly established
as governing precedent.
Prior to its decision in Johnson, the Court had not spoken to the question
whether Weber's construction of Title VII applies to public sector employers,
which are subject to the constraints of the fourteenth amendment. Johnson
settled this question authoritatively and correctly: Weber does apply to public
sector employers. 25 7
ii. Manifest imbalance
Another important question settled by Johnson concerns the meaning of
Weber's requirement that an affirmative action plan be "designed to elim-
inate conspicuous racial imbalance in traditionally segregated job catego-
ries. ' 28 Justice White had stated that he had understood the phrase
"traditionally segregated job categories" to imply that prior discrimination
by the company adopting the plan is a necessary predicate for racially
preferential affirmative action, which must be justified as a remedy for such
discrimination.259 The Brennan-Powell majority in Johnson firmly rejected
that interpretation, 260 pointing out that under such a rule the plan in Weber
itself would not have been upheld. 261
For similar reasons, the Brennan-Powell majority rejected Justice O'Con-
nor's position that Weber should be narrowed by interpreting "manifest
imbalance" to mean an imbalance that would support a prima facie case
that the employer had been guilty of discrimination. 262 The Brennan-Powell
majority's position on this issue is supported by the fact that in Weber itself
the Court chose not to adopt the "arguable violation" theory discussed by
Justice Blackmun in his concurring opinion, since that theory is similar to
Justice O'Connor's prima facie case approach.263 In Johnson, the Court
explained:
255. Id. at 1460-61 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
256. Id. at 1465 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 1472-74 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
257. Id. at 1449-50 & n.6. Cf. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328-32 (1977) (Title
VII effects test applied to public employer defendant); Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840,
856-58 (1976) (federal employee plaintiff entitled to same Title VII trial de novo as private
sector plaintiffs).
258. Weber, 443 U.S. at 209 (footnote omitted).
259. Firefighters, 106 S. Ct. at 3081 (White, J., dissenting); Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1465
(White, J., dissenting).
260. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1451-53.
261. Id. at 1452-53 n.10.
262. Compare id. at 1452-53 (rejecting Justice O'Connor's position) with id. at 1461-63
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
263. Id. at 1451. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 211-13 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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Weber held that an employer seeking to justify the adoption of a plan
need not point to its own prior discriminatory practices, nor even to
evidence of an "arguable violation" on its part. . . . Rather, it need
point only to a "conspicuous . . . imbalance in traditionally segregated
job categories." Our decision was grounded in the recognition that vol-
untary employer action can play a crucial role in furthering Title VII's
purpose of eliminating the effects of discrimination in the workplace,
and that Title VII should not be read to thwart such efforts. . . . A
manifest imbalance need not be such that it would support a prima facie
case against the employer, as suggested in Justice O'CONNOR'S concur-
rence, since we do not regard as identical the constraints of Title VII
and the federal constitution on voluntarily adopted affirmative action
plans. Application of the "prima facie" standard in Title VII cases would
be inconsistent with Weber's focus on statistical imbalance, and could
inappropriately create a significant disincentive for employers to adopt
an affirmative action plan.-
Therefore, Johnson has established a standard which defines the necessary
factual predicate of manifest imbalance in terms that Justice O'Connor
correctly characterized as "expansive. " 5 The most important consequence
of this standard is that it permits an employer to justify affirmative action
on the basis of imbalances attributable to "the effects of discrimination in
the workplace." 26 In other words, "societal discrimination" can be a suf-
ficient justification for voluntary affirmative action so far as Title VII is
concerned, even though it probably would not be a sufficient justification
under the fourteenth amendment.267 This distinction is of substantial practical
significance because private employers, unlike public employers, are not
limited by the constitutional standard.
Johnson's reaffirmation of a broad interpretation of manifest imbalance
would seem to validate the approach of the Executive Order program which
requires federal contractors to take affirmative action to remedy "underu-
tilization" of minorities in their work forces. 68 The program upheld in
Johnson was based on the same concept of "underrepresentation," 269 and
the Court explicitly approved the use of the concept there. 270 At the same
time, the Court noted that the plan in Johnson "expressly directed that
264. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1451-53 (citations and footnotes omitted).
265. Id. at 1461 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). See also Weber, 443 U.S. at
213-15 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
266. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1451.
267. See infra text accompanying notes 291-98; Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1462-63 (O'Connor,
J., concurring in the judgment).
268. See Exec. Order No. 11,246, as amended, reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e at 28-31
(1982); 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-2.11, 60-2.12 (1986) (Revised Order No. 4) (required utilization analysis
and establishment of goals and timetables for nonconstruction contractors). See also Contractors
Ass'n of Eastern Pa. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854
(1971) (upholding validity of Executive Order and "Philadelphia Plan").
269. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1446-47.
270. Id. at 1453-55.
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numerous factors be taken into account in making hiring decisions, including
specifically the qualifications of female applicants for particular jobs." 2"1
This is important because it is necessary to analyze a "specialized labor
pool" in order to determine "underrepresentation in some positions. If a
plan failed to take distinctions in qualifications into account in providing
guidance for actual employment decisions, it would [improperly] dictate mere
blind hiring by the numbers . . . regardless of ... economic conditions or
the number of qualified minority applicants ... z The Court also noted
that the plan in Johnson, like the one approved in Weber,27 was temporary
in the sense that it "was intended to attain a balanced work force, not to
maintain one." 274
iii. Burdens on nonminorities
In considering whether the plan in Johnson unnecessarily trammeled the
interests of male employees, the Court noted that the plan was less drastic
than the one approved in Weber because it did not set aside any positions
for women 75 In addition, the "denial of the promotion [to the complaining
male employee] unsettled no legitimate firmly rooted expectation on the part
of the petitioner. . .. [H]e retained his employment with the Agency, at
the same salary and with the same seniority, and remained eligible for other
promotions." 276
On the other hand, it should not go unnoticed that in two significant
respects the action approved in Johnson was arguably more severe in its
impact on nonminorities than the action at issue in Weber. First, in Johnson
the complaining male employee was undeniably deprived of a particular
promotion which he might well have obtained were it not for the affirmative
action program.27 By contrast, in Weber the training opportunity denied to
the complaining white employee would not even have existed in the absence
of the affirmative action plan. Under the Weber plan, the prior practice of
hiring trained outsiders was replaced with a program that created new op-
portunities for training and advancement for white as well as black em-
ployees, and simply reserved 50Oo of those new opportunities for blacksY
Second, the white employee's complaint in Weber was not that he was
more qualified than black employees who obtained the training opportunities
in question, but that he had more seniority. Yet the plan which created the
271. Id. at 1455.
272. Id. at 1454 (citation omitted).
273. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208. See also supra text accompanying note 245.
274. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1456.
275. Id. at 1455.
276. Id. at 1455-56 (footnote omitted).
277. Id. at 1468-69 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
278. Weber, 443 U.S. at 197-99.
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opportunities in question and provided that they not be filled entirely on
the basis of seniority was contained in a collective-bargaining agreement
between the company and the union.2 9 In Johnson, by contrast, the trial
court found not only that the female employee's sex was the determining
factor in her obtaining the promotion in question, but also that the male
employee was "more qualified." These findings were not overturned by the
court of appeals. 280 Although the Court adverted to very real reasons for
being skeptical of these findings,281 it also did not overturn them. Therefore,
Johnson must be read to approve the granting of a preference on the basis
of sex to a female employee who was less qualified (albeit only marginally
so) than the male employee over whom she was promoted.
2. Constitutional Issues
Most significant statutory issues regarding affirmative action in employ-
ment have been settled by the Court's recent decisions in the contexts of
court orders, consent decrees, and voluntary action.282 Important constitu-
tional questions in the court order context have also been settled.2183 In the
consent decree and voluntary action contexts, constitutional issues arise only
in the public sector.3 This remaining area of discussion-constitutional
constraints on voluntary affirmative action by public employers-is one in
which certain issues have not yet been settled by any majority of the Court.
As explained above, although there is no general formulation of the
constitutional standard of review that has been subscribed to by a majority
of the Court, as a practical matter one should assume that the Powell
standard must be satisfied in order for the Court to uphold race-conscious
affirmative action imposed upon any employer-private or public-or vol-
untarily undertaken by a public employer. 28 The Powell standard requires
that the affirmative action in question be justified by a compelling govern-
mental interest, and that it be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. 8
In the court order context, it is settled that the tailoring requirement should
be flexibly interpreted.w It is also settled that, in both the court order and
279. Id.
280. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1449; id. at 1469 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
281. Id. at 1457 n.17; id. at 1464-65 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at
1468-69 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
282. See supra text accompanying notes 34-123, 196-212, 216-27, 233-81.
283. See supra text accompanying notes 124-62.
284. See supra text accompanying notes 213-15.
285. See supra text accompanying notes 124-35. As previously noted, the Court has not
discussed the constitutional standard in the context of gender-conscious affirmative action in
employment. See supra note 135.
286. See supra text accompanying note 125.
287. See supra text accompanying notes 149-61.
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the voluntary context, remedying past discrimination by the governmental
entity involved is a compelling interest justifying race-conscious affirmative
action.2 8 The beneficiaries of such action need not be limited to identified
victims of past discrimination. 2 9
With this much settled, four general questions remain open. First, apart
from remedying past discrimination by the governmental entity involved,
what other interests, if any, are sufficiently compelling to justify race-
conscious affirmative action? Second, where past discrimination is the as-
serted justification, what constitutes a sufficient showing to support that
justification? Third, is the tailoring requirement to be interpreted flexibly
in the voluntary action context? Fourth, in evaluating burdens on innocent
third parties from a constitutional perspective, how does one separate the
permissible from the impermissible?
a. Compelling Interests
In the Wygant case, the Court considered the constitutional validity of a
collectively-bargained layoff system that gave preferential treatment to mi-
nority school teachers to the extent necessary to maintain the percentage of
minority employment that had been reached prior to the layoffs. 290 As the
case came to the Court, the lower courts had justified the layoff policy by
relying on "the [School] Board's interest in providing minority role models
for its minority students, as an attempt to alleviate the effects of societal
discrimination." 291 Four members of the Court-Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor-held that societal discrimination
alone, without any showing of prior discrimination by the governmental unit
involved, "is too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified
remedy. "292 They also held that the role model theory is similarly unac-
ceptable and "has no logical stopping point." 293 This holding did not muster
a majority, however, because Justice White concurred in the judgment simply
on the basis that "[n]one of the interests asserted by the board"-which in
the Supreme Court included not only the role model and societal discrimi-
nation theories but also the interest in remedying the board's own past
discrimination294-justified "this racially discriminatory layoff policy. ' 295
288. See supra text accompanying note 138.
289. See supra text accompanying note 139.
290. 106 S. Ct. at 1844-45 (opinion of Powell, J.).
291. Id. at 1847 (opinion of Powell, J.).
292. Id. at 1848 (opinion of Powell, J.). See also id. at 1854 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
293. Id. at 1847 (opinion of Powell, J.). See also id. at 1854 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
294. Id. at 1848-49 (opinion of Powell, J.).
295. Id. at 1857 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
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In view of Justice White's negative responses to affirmative action in all
the recent cases, his failure to subscribe to Justice Powell's plurality opinion
in Wygant may only theoretically withhold majority status from the rejection
of the role model and societal discrimination justifications. On the other
hand, Justice Stevens argued in dissent in Wygant that past discrimination
by the school board was not a constitutionally necessary predicate for the
affirmative action in question, which he believed was justified by the "sound
educational purpose" of maintaining " 'multi-ethnic representation on the
teaching faculty.' "296 Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun argued
that the plan "was a legitimate and necessary response both to racial dis-
crimination and to educational imperatives. '"
Wygant, therefore, does not resolve definitively the question whether so-
cietal discrimination alone can be a sufficiently compelling governmental
interest to justify an affirmative action program under the constitutional
standard. Although societal discrimination is a sufficient justification under
the Title VII standard,2 s there is considerably less significance to the dispute
over the constitutional standard than meets the eye. If a difference exists
between the constitutional and the statutory standards, the constitutional
standard is in any event applicable only to public employers. More impor-
tantly, if past discrimination by a public employer were the relevant con-
stitutional test, it would not be difficult to meet in most instances where
affirmative action might be thought appropriate, given the pervasive history
of past discrimination in this country. Indeed, that standard was probably
met in Wygant itself. In view of the state of the record, however, it is
perfectly understandable that the plurality was unwilling to decide the case
on the assumption that past discrimination by the school board existed.2 99
At the other pole from the theoretically unsettled question whether "so-
cietal discrimination alone''00 is constitutionally sufficient to justify race-
conscious affirmative action, it is by no means established that past dis-
crimination by the governmental entity involved is the only justification that
296. Id. at 1868 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
297. Id. at 1866 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 362 (Brennan, White,
Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). The
four justices stated:
Davis' articulated purpose of remedying the effects of past societal discrimi-
nation is... sufficiently important to justify the use of race-conscious admissions
programs where there is a sound basis for concluding that minority underrepre-
sentation is substantial and chronic, and that the handicap of past discrimination
is impeding access of minorities to the Medical School.
Id.
298. See supra text accompanying notes 258-67.
299. Compare Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1858-60, 1862-63 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (discussing
the facts) with id. at 1848-49 & n.5 (opinion of Powell, J.) (discussing the evidence) and id.
at 1856-57 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (discussing the
evidence).
300. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1847 (opinion of Powell, J.).
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will withstand constitutional scrutiny. Justice Powell's plurality opinion in
Wygant stated that "the Court has insisted upon some showing of prior
discrimination by the governmental unit involved before allowing limited use
of racial classifications in order to remedy such discrimination."'0 However,
Justice O'Connor pointed out that "a state interest in the promotion of
racial diversity [in a student body] has been found sufficiently 'compelling,'
at least in the context of higher education, to support the use of racial
considerations in furthering that interest." 3°0 She correctly cited Justice Pow-
ell's opinion in Regents of University of California v. Bakke °30 in support
of that observation. She went on to state that "nothing the Court has said
today necessarily forecloses the possibility that the Court will find other
governmental interests . . . to be sufficiently 'important' or 'compelling' to
sustain the use of affirmative action policies." 3°4
Justice Stevens, who in Wygant declared his view that "it is not necessary
to find that the Board of Education has been guilty of racial discrimination
in the past to support the conclusion that it has a legitimate interest in
employing more black teachers in the future,"3 o0 elaborated on this theme
in the Johnson case. Although his comments in Johnson were made in the
statutory context, they were sufficiently broad to apply in the constitutional
context as well. Noting that in many cases employers might properly look
to the future rather than to the past "to consider other legitimate reasons
to give preferences to members of under-represented groups," Justice Stevens
quoted with approval from a law review article hypothesizing many such
"forward-looking" justifications for affirmative action.306
In light of the views expressed by Justices O'Connor and Stevens, as well
as the reliance by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun on "educational
imperatives" in Wygant,3°7 it may well be that, in an appropriate case, a
majority of the Court would find a sufficient constitutional predicate for
race-conscious affirmative action in considerations other than past discrim-
ination by the governmental entity involved.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 1853 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
303. 438 U.S. 265, 311-15 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.).
304. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1853 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
305. Id. at 1867 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
306. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1460 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Sullivan, The Supreme
Court, 1985 Term-Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HAgv.
L. REv. 78, 96 (1986) (giving as examples of other justifications improving the quality of
education, improving services to black constituencies, averting racial tension, and increasing
the diversity of a work force)).
307. 106 S. Ct. at 1866 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 1863, 1866-67 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting).
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b. Evidence of Past Discrimination
In Wygant, the Court also addressed the question of what showing is
necessary when the asserted justification for affirmative action is past dis-
crimination by the government employer. Unlike in the private sector, where
manifest imbalance in a traditionally segregated job category is all that need
be shown, 0 the constitution may impose a higher evidentiary threshold.
This question has little practical significance, except for the impact it has
on a public employer's ability to compensate for societal discrimination rather
than its own.c 9 Be that as it may, the Court did not produce a majority
opinion on the question.
Justice Powell's plurality opinion for four justices in Wygant stated that
"a public employer like the Board must ensure that, before it embarks on
an affirmative action program, it has convincing evidence that remedial
action is warranted. That is, it must have sufficient evidence to justify the
conclusion that there has been prior discrimination. ' 310 If the employer's
action is challenged by nonminority employees, "the trial court must make
a factual determination that the employer had a strong basis in evidence for
its conclusion that remedial action was necessary. ' 311
Justice O'Connor, a member of Justice Powell's plurality, elaborated on
this standard in a separate opinion. She emphasized that the employer's
"remedial purpose need not be accompanied by contemporaneous findings
of actual discrimination to be accepted as legitimate as long as the public
actor has a firm basis for believing that remedial action is required. '312 She
explained that such a firm basis for the Board's belief in "apparent prior
employment discrimination" could be provided, for example, by "demon-
strable evidence of a disparity between the percentage of qualified blacks
on a school's teaching staff and the percentage of qualified minorities in
the relevant labor pool sufficient to support a prima facie Title VII pattern
or practice claim by minority teachers." 313 Of course, a prima facie case
under Title VII may be established either by a showing of disparate treatment
(purposeful discrimination) or by a showing of disparate impact (discrimi-
natory effect). 3 4 Moreover, a prima facie case is by definition subject to
308. See supra text accompanying notes 258-65.
309. See supra text accompanying notes 266-67.
310. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1848 (opinion of Powell, J.).
311. Id.
312. Id. at 1853 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
313. Id. at 1856 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (emphasis
added). Justice O'Connor reiterated and further elaborated upon her proposed standard in
Johnson, where she argued unsuccessfully that it, rather than the Brennan-Powell majority's
interpretation of manifest imbalance, should also be the statutory standard. 107 S. Ct. at 1461-
63 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). See also supra text accompanying notes 262-
65.
314. See, e.g., Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335-36 n.15.
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rebuttal, and Justice O'Connor's articulation of the standard emphasized
the governmental actor's belief in an apparent violation, rather than con-
clusive proof of an actual violation. In addition, the ultimate burden of
persuasion in a reverse discrimination case rests with the person challenging
the validity of the affirmative action program.3 1 5
Neither Justice Powell's nor Justice O'Connor's description in Wygant of
the required quantum of proof was subscribed to by a majority, and the
question cannot therefore be viewed as definitively settled. It seems fair to
assume, however, that Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens
would subscribe to a formulation at least as permissive as Justice O'Connor's.
Justice O'Connor also concluded that a contemporaneous finding by the
governmental unit adopting the affirmative action program is unnecessary. 1 6
This proposition should be regarded as definitively settled because Justice
Powell's plurality opinion assumed sub silentio,3 7 and Justice Marshall's
dissenting opinion stated explicitly, 318 that a contemporaneous finding is not
required.31 9
c. Tailoring
On the question of the degree of flexibility with which the "narrowly
tailored" requirement is to be applied, Wygant also did not produce a
315. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1848 (opinion of Powell, J.); id. at 1856 (O'Connor, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment); Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1449.
316. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at '1853 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
317. See id. at 1848-49 (opinion of Powell, J.).
This reading of Justice Powell's opinion suggests a retreat by Justice Powell from his
previously expressed insistence that "the legitimate interest in creating a race-conscious remedy
is not compelling unless an appropriate governmental authority has found that [a constitutional
or statutory] violation has occurred." Fulilove, 448 U.S. at 498 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice
Powell's opinion in Wygant does not cite his opinion in Fullilove.
Of course, in Fuilove itself, Justice Powell applied his then asserted standard rather per-
missively, see id. at 502-06, noting that "[a]lthough the discriminatory activities were not
identified with the exactitude expected in judicial or administrative adjudication, it must be
remembered that 'Congress may paint with a much broader brush than may this Court.' " Id.
at 506 (citation omitted). See also id. at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("The Court's attempt
to characterize the law as a proper remedial measure to counteract the effects of past or present
racial discrimination is remarkably unconvincing."); id. at 546 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice
Stevens stated:
Just why a wealthy Negro or Spanish-speaking investor should have a preferred
status in bidding on a construction contract in Alaska-or a citizen of Eskimo
ancestry should have a preference in Miami or Detroit-is difficult to understand
in light of either the asserted remedial character of the set-aside or the more basic
purposes of the public works legislation.
Id.
318. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1862-63 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
319. Both Justice O'Connor and Justice Marshall advanced persuasive reasons for this con-
clusion. See id. at 1855-56 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment);
id. at 1862-63 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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majority approach. The question was addressed only in Justice Powell's
plurality opinion and in Justice O'Connor's concurrence.
Justice Powell's discussion merged the question of tailoring with the ques-
tion of the burden on innocent third parties. He held that the tailoring of
the layoff plan was not sufficiently narrow because the burden was too
intrusive and "less intrusive means of accomplishing similar purposes-such
as the adoption of hiring goals-[were] available. ' 3 20 It is not clear what
legal conclusion about tailoring should be drawn from this analysis, because
the actual availability of less intrusive alternatives in Wygant seems highly
questionable. Justice Marshall argued in dissent that "[a]s a matter of logic
as well as fact, a hiring policy achieves no purpose at all if it is eviscerated
by layoffs." '32' Strictly speaking, this may be an exaggeration. However,
Justice Marshall went on to point out that "neither petitioners nor any
Justice of this Court has suggested an alternative to [the collectively-bar-
gained layoff policy] that would have attained the stated goal [of preserving
minority employment gains] in any narrower or more equitable a fashion.
Nor can I conceive of one. ' '322 Justice Marshall's point may be disputable
as a matter of theory, because the goal of overcoming past discrimination
need not necessarily include the goal of preserving a particular level of
minority employment in the face of layoffs. Nevertheless, his criticisms of
Justice Powell's reasoning are sufficiently cogent to suggest that what really
troubled Justice Powell in Wygant was simply the burden of layoffs and
not any problem of tailoring. If so, Justice Powell's opinion does not provide
much guidance on the broader question of the flexibility with which the
tailoring criterion should be applied.
Justice O'Connor's discussion of tailoring in Wygant focused on the fact
that the layoff provision was designed to safeguard a hiring goal which she
believed was defective because the goal was keyed to the percentage of
minorities in the student body rather than in the relevant labor force. 23 If
one assumes (contrary to Justice Marshall's dissent324) that Justice O'Con-
nor's criticism of the hiring goal was accurate and related to an issue properly
before the Court, then the basis for her finding of a lack of proper tailoring
was quite limited and fact-bound and provided little guidance on how she
might apply the tailoring criterion in other contexts. 325
In any event, no opinion in Wygant commanded a majority, and the
ambiguity concerning the tailoring issue may well have been removed last
320. Id. at 1852 (opinion of Powell, J.).
321. Id. at 1864 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
322. Id. at 1865 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
323. Id. at 1857 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
324. Id. at 1860-61 n.3 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
325. In the court order context, Justice O'Connor subsequently applied the tailoring criterion
in a manner which was rejected as unduly strict by the Brennan-Powell majority. See supra
text accompanying notes 159-61, 187-89, 193-94.
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term. The flexible approach to the tailoring criterion adopted in Paradise
by the Brennan-Powell majority326 does not on its face appear to be limited
to the court order context. However, the Paradise opinion did rely in part
on the concept of the chancellor's equitable remedial discretion. Since there
are obvious differences between governmental units voluntarily adopting
affirmative action programs and federal judges issuing orders upon a finding
of discrimination, it is conceivable that the tailoring standard might be
applied more strictly in the voluntary action context.
d. Burdens on Nonminorities
The constitutional limits on the burdens that may be imposed on innocent
third parties were illuminated, although not definitively resolved, by Wygant
and the subsequent cases. In Wygant, four justices (the Powell plurality
minus Justice O'Connor, and Justice White) held that the racially preferential
layoff policy imposed an unacceptable burden on white teachers, and that
this burden rendered the policy unconstitutional.127 Justice Powell's opinion
emphasized the distinction between race-based layoffs and racial hiring goals.
The burden that hiring goals impose on innocent individuals "is diffused to
a considerable extent among society generally," while "layoffs impose the
entire burden of achieving racial equality on particular individuals . . .
In addition, the injury imposed by layoffs-loss of an existing job, disruption
of important settled expectations, and "serious disruption of . . . lives"-
is more severe than mere denial of a future employment opportunity.32 9 The
burden of layoffs "is too intrusive.''330 In subsequent cases, the Brennan-
Powell majority reiterated this distinction, upholding not only hiring goals
but also promotion goals partly on the basis that the burdens there were
both less severe and more diffuse. 33'
326. See supra text accompanying notes 156-61.
327. Wygant, 106 S. Ct: at 1851-52 (opinion of Powell, J.); id. at 1857-58 (White, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
328. Id. at 1851 (opinion of Powell, J.).
329. Id. at 1851-52 (opinion of Powell, J.).
330. Id. at 1852 (opinion of Powell, J.).
331. Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3052-53 (opinion of Brennan, J.) (hiring goals); id.
at 3056-57 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Paradise, 107 S.
Ct. at 1073 (opinion of Brennan, J.) ("Because the one-for-one requirement is ... limited in
scope and duration, it only postpones the promotions of qualified whites. Consequently, like
a hiring goal, it 'impose[s] a diffuse burden .... foreclosing only one of several opportunities.'
(citation omitted)); id. at 1076 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell stated:
Although the burden of a ... promotion goal ... is not diffused among society
generally, the burden is shared by the nonminority employees over a period of
time .... Although some white troopers will have their promotions delayed, it
is uncertain whether any individual trooper, white or black, would have achieved
a different rank, or would have achieved it at a different time, but for the
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Of course, awards of competitive seniority to identified victims of dis-
crimination are proper even though they have an adverse impact on non-
minority employees when layoffs are based on seniority.332 Moreover, Justice
O'Connor, a member of the five-justice majority that struck down the layoff
plan in Wygant, explicitly reserved the question whether even non-victim-
specific race-based layoffs might be constitutionally acceptable in some cir-
cumstances: "Nor is it necessary, in my view, to resolve the troubling
questions of whether any layoff provision could survive strict scrutiny or
whether this particular layoff provision could, when considered without
reference to the hiring goal it was intended to further, pass the onerous
'narrowly tailored' requirement." '333 Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that non-
victim-specific racial preferences will be upheld under any circumstances in
the layoff context.
The supposed distinctions that result in layoffs being placed in a class by
themselves, apart from hiring and promotion preferences, are subject to
serious question. Justice Marshall made a rather convincing case in Wygant
that the layoff provision there was a reasonable collectively-bargained com-
promise in which the interests of all concerned were fairly and appropriately
taken into account.334 In addition, Justice Stevens' criticism of the distinction
between layoffs and other actions came close to being unanswerable, at least
from a theoretical perspective:
The fact that the issue arises in a layoff context, rather than a hiring
context, has no bearing on the equal protection question. For if the
Board's interest in employing more minority teachers is sufficient to
justify providing them with an extra incentive to accept jobs in Jackson,
Michigan, it is also sufficient to justify their retention when the number
of available jobs is reduced. Justice POWELL's suggestion . . . that
there is a distinction of constitutional significance under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause between a racial preference at the time of hiring and an
promotion requirement.
Id. See also Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1455-56 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) ("[D]enial of the promotion unsettled no legitimate firmly rooted expectation on the
part of petitioner.... [Wlhile ... [he] was denied a promotion, he retained his employment
with the Agency, at the same salary and with the same seniority, and remained eligible for
other promotions." (footnote omitted) (applying statutory standard, not constitutional stan-
dard)). Compare also Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1850-51 (opinion of Powell, J.) ("In Fulliove,
the challenged statute required at least 10 percent of federal public works funds to be used in
contracts with minority-owned business enterprises. This requirement was found to be within
the remedial powers of Congress in part because the 'actual burden shouldered by nonminority
firms is relatively light.' " (citation omitted)) with Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319-20 (opinion of
Powell, J.) ("[The Davis special admissions program] tells applicants who are not Negro, Asian,
or Chicano that they are totally excluded from a specific percentage of the seats in an entering
class. . . .At the same time, the preferred applicants have the opportunity to compete for
every seat in the class.").
332. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1852 n.12 (opinion of Powell, J.).
333. Id. at 1857 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
334. Id. at 1858-60, 1863-66 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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identical preference at the time of discharge is thus wholly unpersuasive.
He seems to assume that a teacher who has been working for a few
years suffers a greater harm when he is laid off than the harm suffered
by an unemployed teacher who is refused a job for which he is qualified.
In either event, the adverse decision forecloses "only one of several
opportunities" that may be available... to the disappointed teacher. 335
Nevertheless, however pristine the logic of Justice Stevens' argument, this
is a situation where practical considerations may overwhelm the theoretical
perspective. Putting questions of legal theory aside, there are respects in
which, at a fundamental level of lay perception and experience, and as a
fundamental matter of personnel relations, race-based layoffs are more ob-
jectionable than race-based hiring. The consequences of being laid off-the
burdens perceived and experienced-are considerably more severe than the
consequences of not being hired in the first place. Both because of its
immediate impact on the worker's present economic circumstances, and
because of its impact on the worker's most basic expectations (whether or
not those expectations are legally protected as a theoretical matter), a race-
based layoff is perceived and experienced as the most threatening and of-
fensive form of preferential affirmative action. It cannot be entirely inap-
propriate for the law to take into account these common sense realities of
psychology, economics, and employee relations. By the same token, there
is also some reason to be more concerned, and correspondingly more careful,
about the impact of minority promotion quotas on other incumbent em-
ployees than about the impact of hiring quotas on rejected applicants.
Incumbent employees must maintain cooperative relationships in the work-
place, and employees disadvantaged by promotion quotas have expectations
concerning opportunities for advancement based on their years of service to
their employer. On the other hand, applicants for employment have no pre-
existing relationship either with their prospective employer or with their
prospective co-workers.
One may fairly question whether these kinds of distinctions are of con-
stitutional dimension. It may be sufficient to rely on employers and unions
to give appropriate weight to these considerations in the voluntary action
context, and to rely on the informed discretion of judges in the court order
context (where these and other questions of burden-weighing also may arise).
However, the distinction Justice Powell has drawn between layoffs on the
one hand, and hiring and promotion on the other, does bear the imprint of
a certain practical wisdom. In this respect, the distinction between layoffs
and other employment decisions may be similar to the distinction Justice
Powell drew in Bakke between admissions programs which set aside a number
of positions for minorities and programs which merely take race into account
335. Id. at 1870 n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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as one among many factors to be considered.33 6 What such distinctions lack
in theoretical validity-and they can be attacked from both sides of the
underlying philosophical argument337-they may make up for in solomonic
justice.
II. SuMMARY AND EVALUATION
The Supreme Court has expended much effort, and has been closely
divided, in its examination of the issues raised by affirmative action in
employment. However, the most important issues in this area have now been
settled, as explained in the preceding analysis. In summarizing and evaluating
the Court's overall performance, it is convenient to discuss the statutory
issues and the constitutional issues separately. It then seems appropriate to
comment on certain overriding policy issues.
A. Statutory Issues
The language, legislative history, and purposes of Title VII have been well
served by the Court's ventures in statutory interpretation.
336. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315-20 (opinion of Powell, J.).
337. E.g., compare id. at 378-79 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) with Bork, The Unpersuasive Bakke Decision,
Wall St. J., July 21, 1978, at 8, col 4. In Bakke, Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and
Blackmun stated:
Davis' special admissions program cannot be said to violate the Constitution
simply because it has set aside a predetermined number of places for qualified
minority applicants rather than using minority status as a positive factor to be
considered .... For purposes of constitutional adjudication, there is no difference
between the two approaches. In any admissions program which accords special
consideration to... racial minorities, a determination of the degree of preference
to be given is unavoidable, and any given preference that results in the exclusion
of a white candidate is no more or less constitutionally acceptable than a program
such as that at Davis ...
. . . That the Harvard approach does not also make public the extent of the
preference and the precise workings of the system while the Davis program employs
a specific, openly stated number, does not condemn the latter plan for purposes
of Fourteenth Amendment adjudication. It may be that the Harvard plan is more
acceptable to the public than the Davis "quota." . . . But there is no basis for
preferring [as a matter of constitutional law] a particular preference program
simply because. . . it proceeds in a manner that is not immediately apparent to
the public.
438 U.S. at 378-79. By comparison, Professor Bork has stated:
Justice Powell's middle position-universities may not use raw racial quotas but
may consider race, among other factors, in the interest of diversity among the
student body-has been praised as a statesmanlike solution to an agonizing prob-
lem. It may be. Unfortunately, in constitutional terms, his argument is not ul-
timately persuasive.
... (Justice Powell's rule may not prove remarkably different in action from
Justice Brennan's, for it does not allow for the hypocrisy of many universities in
this area. Race will be taken into account, and educators' candor may suffer
more than quotas.).
Bork, supra, at 8, col. 4.
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1. Litigated Court Orders
The Court interpreted section 703(h) in Stotts and Sheet Metal Workers
as barring court-ordered interference with bona fide seniority systems except
when necessary to provide make-whole relief to identified victims of dis-
crimination.3 8 This interpretation is now established because it has been
subscribed to by a majority of justices, and it is correct. If it is considered
unfortunate that the beneficiaries of affirmative action in hiring may suffer
some disadvantage as a result of lack of seniority, and that the effects of
affirmative hiring efforts may be diluted to some extent as a result, it must
be remembered that these consequences flow from clearly expressed con-
gressional intent. As a matter of individual fairness and equity, the minority
person who was not a victim of the employer's discrimination has scant
basis to complain of being placed on the same footing as contemporaneously
hired nomninorities for purposes of layoffs and other benefits governed by
competitive seniority. As a matter of social engineering, Congress is free to
amend Title VII in the unlikely event that it cares to ameliorate this result.
Sheet Metal Workers also correctly interpreted section 7030) as having no
effect on the availability of court-ordered remedial quotas, and this inter-
pretation also is firmily established.33 9 There is an obvious difference between
the concepts of liability and remedy, and between quotas to overcome im-
balance and quotas to overcome proven discrimindtion. The Court properly
read section 7030) as incorporating these distinctions.
The Court's interpretation of section 706(g), as clarified in Sheet Metal
Workers, is also correct.3 4 It is now established that section 706(g) does not
preclude granting preferential relief to nonvictims. Make-whole relief is lim-
ited to victims of discrimination, but class-based affirmative relief is not.
Any other rule would improperly tie the hands of a court of equity and
also reward those defendants whose exclusionary policies have been most
successful in deterring minority applicants. The Court's interpretation is
consistent with the language, legislative history, and purpose of section
706(g).
Under the proper view of section 706(g), numerical relief is available in
a variety of circumstances, and such relief is not restricted to the most
egregious cases. The reasons why this should be regarded as established by
the Brennan-Powell majority have been explained above.3 4' It is less clear
whether it is settled that an award (or a denial) of numerical relief is to be
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. The reasons for believing
that this is the standard applied by the Brennan-Powell majority have been
338. See supra text accompanying notes 34-56.
339. See supra text accompanying notes 57-66.
340. See supra text accompanying notes 57-123.
341. See supra text accompanying notes 86-92, 111-23.
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discussed above.342 In any event, the factors to be considered in reviewing
such decisions are clearly established: the justifications for the relief; the
connection between the relief and the violation; the propriety of the relief's
formulation from the standpoints of flexibility, duration, and appropriate
calculation of numbers and percentages; and the impact of the relief on
nomninorities. These factors, and the manner in which the Brennan-Powell
majority has applied them, are entirely consistent with an abuse of discretion
standard.343
2. Consent Decrees
Firefighters establishes that consent decrees and any uncontested orders
modifying or enforcing such decrees are to be treated exactly like voluntary
action taken outside the litigation context insofar as Title VII's limitations
on preferential affirmative action are concerned.344 Initially it may seem
anomalous to ignore the fact that voluntary action agreed to in a consent
decree is incorporated into a court order which, if violated', triggers the
remedies for contempt. On balance, however, the Court has persuasively
explained its treatment of consent decrees as voluntary action. 45
The practical consequences of this treatment are of limited significance.
Contested orders issued under consent decrees are subject to the same stan-
dards as other litigated orders, and consent decrees do not by their mere
existence resolve the claims of nonparties." It seems perfectly appropriate
that the parties to a collective-bargaining agreement may modify its seniority
provisions by consent decree if they could modify them by agreement outside
of litigation, regardless of whether a court could achieve the same result
within the constraints of section 703(h).3 7 Since section 7030) does not limit
court-ordered numerical remedies or voluntary affirmative action, 48 there is
no reason why it should affect consent decrees differently. Finally, although
sections 703(a)-(d), rather than section 706(g), supply the operative limitations
on affirmative action by consent decree, this has practical significance only
to the extent that it allows a consent decree to provide relief for societal
discrimination as well as for the defendant's discrimination. If that may be
done by voluntary agreement-and it can under Weber and Johnson-then
the fact that the agreement is preceded by a lawsuit and incorporated in a
court order should not and does not change the result. 349
342. See supra text accompanying notes 93-108, 111-23.
343. See supra text accompanying notes 109-10. See also supra text accompanying notes 162-
95.
344. See supra text accompanying notes 196-212, 216-18, 227.
345. See supra text accompanying notes 205-08, 227.
346. See supra text accompanying notes 219-22.
347. See supra text accompanying note 218.
348. See supra text accompanying notes 57-66, 233; supra note 60.
349. See supra text accompanying notes 213-15, 258-67.
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3. Voluritary Action
The conclusion that sections 703(h), 703(j), and 706(g) of Title VII do
not apply to voluntary affirmative action is obviously correct.350 The Court's
interpretation of sections 703(a)-(d) to permit a broad range of freedom for
voluntary affirmative action involving preferential treatment for minorities
is subject to reasonable dispute as a matter of theory, but the dispute has
been definitively resolved by Weber and Johnson.35" ' Although the Court's
interpretation may be difficult to reconcile with the language of Title VII,
the Court has convincingly explained why the legislative history and the
purposes of Title VII are well served by its result. In addition, the Court's
conclusion that Title VII's statutory standard applies to the public sector
in the same way that it applies to the private sector is plainly correct. 352
The Court has adopted a "manifest imbalance" standard, rather than an
"arguable violation" or a "prima facie case" standard, for judging the
sufficiency of the factual predicate for affirmative action under Title VII. 353
Manifest imbalance is a notably permissive standard. The potential for
overbroad action due to sloppiness, market pressure, or political pressure
does exist in the voluntary action context. By contrast, in the court order
context, a finding of discrimination is the necessary predicate, and the
affirmative action in question is carefully formulated by an independent
federal district judge. To the extent that the standard of review in the
voluntary action context is more permissive than in the court order context,
an anomaly exists. 354 However, although preferences for minorities are per-
missible in the voluntary action context, the burden of such preferences on
nonminorities must be considered in the same way in that context as in the
court order context. 355 To that extent, the effect of the anomaly is reduced,
though not eliminated. In any event, the Court's application of a "managerial
discretion" rationale to give wide scope to voluntary affirmative action is
probably consistent with the congressional intent in the private sector. 35 6
Constitutional limitations further circumscribe voluntary action in the public
sector. 35 7
350. See supra text accompanying note 233.
351. See supra text accompanying notes 239-57.
352. See supra text accompanying note 257.
353. See supra text accompanying notes 258-67.
354. Cf. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 107 S. Ct. 1442, 1470
(1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
355. See supra text accompanying notes 244, 275-81.
356. See International Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063, 3074-77
(1986); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 203-07 (1979). See also Johnson,
107 S. Ct. at 1452 n.8.
357. See supra text accompanying notes 282-337.
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B. Constitutional Issues
The Court's constitutional jurisprudence on affirmative action is less clearly
settled than its statutory jurisprudence. However, if the standards that have
been articulated are properly interpreted, the results will continue to be
generally acceptable.
1. Litigated Court Orders
It is settled that court-imposed quota remedies are subject to some form
of heightened constitutional scrutiny under the equal protection component
of the due process clause of the fifth amendment. This is true notwithstanding
Justice Stevens' persuasive argument that it should not be the case.358 How-
ever, the Court has not agreed on a formula for heightened scrutiny either
in the court order or in the voluntary action context. Neither the Brennan
test nor the Powell test has been established as the appropriate formulation
of the heightened scrutiny standard.3 9 The Brennan test would make the
constitutional standard most closely parallel to the statutory standard both
in the court order and in the voluntary action context. Nevertheless, in the
court order context the Powell test, as interpreted and applied in Paradise
by the Brennan-Powell majority, is quite similar to the statutory standard.36°
It is established that a finding of past discrimination provides the necessary
compelling interest to support preferential relief.3 61 The Brennan-Powell ma-
jority's flexible interpretation of the tailoring standard abjures the limitations
of a least restrictive alternative concept and affords to the district courts
substantial room for the exercise of sound discretion. 362 The factors to be
considered in exercising this discretion are the same factors that are relevant
under the statutory standard. 63 The constitutionality of preferential relief to
persons other than identified victims of discrimination is settled, and there
is no reason to believe that such relief is permissible only in particularly
egregious cases. 364
The foregoing theoretical parameters, coupled with the Court's sensible
and sensitive applications of the constitutional standard in Sheet Metal
Workers, in Paradise, and (perhaps more debatably) in Wygant, provide
substantial reassurance that the results in the court order context will usually
be acceptable even to an advocate of Justice Stevens' position on court-
358. See supra text accompanying notes 124-48.
359. See supra text accompanying notes 124-35.
360. See supra text accompanying notes 149-95.
361. See supra text accompanying notes 138, 141.
362. See supra text accompanying notes 149-95.
363. See supra text accompanying note 162.
364. See supra text accompanying notes 139, 142, 158-61, 195.
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ordered relief. To the extent that a distinction has been drawn between
layoffs on the one hand and hiring and promotion on the other, the result
is one that commends itself in practice even if it is difficult to justify as a
matter of theory.3 65
2. Consent Decrees
The same reasoning that frees consent decrees from the statutory restraints
of section 706(g) of Title VII also necessarily frees them from constitutional
restraints when the defendants are in the private sector.36 If one accepts the
Firefighters reasoning in the statutory context, one must accept it in the
constitutional context as well. To the extent that it seems anomalous to
apply different standards in the private and public sectors, the anomaly
applies to all forms of voluntary action, whether or not contained in consent
decrees.
3. Voluntary Action
It is in the area of the constitutional limitations on voluntary affirmative
action by a governmental entity that the greatest uncertainty remains in the
wake of the Court's recent decisions. However, the questions that remain
open are less important than those that have been settled or that seem close
to having been settled. 67
It is settled by Wygant that past discrimination by the governmental entity
involved is a sufficiently compelling justification for preferential affirmative
action, and that a contemporaneous finding of discrimination is not necessary
to establish such a factual predicate.3 68 It may also be assumed that Justice
O'Connor's articulation of the evidentiary standard for concluding that there
has been apparent past discrimination-the prima facie case criterion-will
be the controlling constitutional standard. 69 Nothing indicates that the tai-
loring concept is to be applied differently in the voluntary action context
than in the court order context.3 70 These results are satisfactory. The Court's
method of assessing the burdens imposed on innocent third parties seems
similar in the court order and voluntary action contexts and under the
statutory and constitutional standards. However, it could be argued in future
cases that greater burdens are tolerable when the justification is remedying
past discrimination as opposed to some other asserted interest. 71
365. See supra text accompanying notes 327-37.
366. See supra text accompanying notes 213-15.
367. See supra text accompanying notes 282-337.
368. See supra text accompanying notes 288, 316-19.
369. See supra text accompanying notes 310-16.
370. See supra text accompanying notes 320-26.
371. See supra text accompanying notes 327-37.
[Vol. 63:301
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN EMPLOYMENT
The Court has not determined what other interests may constitute sufficient
justifications for racial classifications. Societal discrimination alone was de-
clared insufficient by a four-justice plurality in Wygant, and this would
probably be the view of a five-justice majority.372 A different five-justice
majority might well find other justifications to be sufficient 31 7 It is appro-
priate that the Court is maintaining an open mind on this question.
The differences between the constitutional and the statutory limitations
on voluntary action do create an anomaly to the extent that the constitutional
limitations on public sector actors are more stringent than the statutory
limitations on private sector actors. The differences in question revolve
around two distinctions. The first distinction is between the prima facie case
standard under the fourteenth amendment and the less stringent manifest
imbalance standard under Title VII. The second distinction is between jus-
tifying affirmative action by reference to the employer's own past discrim-
ination and justifying it by reference to the more expansive concept of societal
discrimination. 374 The anomaly arises because the fundamental objectives of
the fourteenth amendment and of Title VII would appear to be the same:
to eliminate discrimination and to overcome the continuing effects of prior
discrimination.
If the legislative history and purposes of Title VII support providing wide
latitude for voluntary affirmative action, it is not at all clear why the same
is not true of the fourteenth amendment. 375 From this point of view, sym-
metry should be achieved by equating the constitutional standard with the
permissive statutory standard. From the opposite point of view, it has been
argued that the statutory standard should be defined to incorporate the
restrictive constitutional standard. 76 It has also been argued that the con-
stitutional and statutory standards should be symmetrical even though in
one respect this may loosen the constitutional standard, and in another
respect it may tighten the statutory standard. 3
77
372. See supra text accompanying notes 290-99.
373. See supra text accompanying notes 300-07.
374. See supra text accompanying notes 258-70, 290-99, 308-19.
375. Compare Regents of Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287-99 (1978) (opinion
of Powell, J.) with id. at 355-62 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part) and id. at 387-402 (opinion of Marshall, J.) and
id. at 404-08 (opinion of Blackmun, J.) and Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative
History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. Rav. 753 (1985).
376. See Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1469-70, 1471-72 (Scalla, J., dissenting) (arguing that Weber
should be overruled).
377. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842, 1855 (1986) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("Imposing a contemporaneous findings
requirement would produce the anomalous result that what private employers may voluntarily
do to correct apparent violations of Title VII. . . . Weber . . . , public employers are
constitutionally forbidden to do to correct their statutory and constitutional transgressions.");
Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1461 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) ("In my view, the
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As the precedents now stand, symmetry on the issues in question may be
achieved only by incorporating the more permissive statutory standard into
the constitutional standard, because the statutory standard is firmly estab-
lished. 78 It is unlikely that this particular form of symmetry will soon be
achieved. The asymmetry that remains is probably no more disconcerting
than other peculiarities that have been noted: the possibility of finding some
difference between the constitutional standard applicable to court orders and
the standard of section 706(g) of Title VII;379 the oddity of applying height-
ened scrutiny to a court order remedying discrimination; 30 and the anomaly
of applying a more permissive standard to voluntary affirmative action than
to court orders.38' These wrinkles in the law are not of overriding importance;
the future of affirmative action does not hang in the balance.
So far as the present issues are concerned, it may simply be impossible
to achieve perfect symmetry between the public sector and the private sector
when two different sources of law are applicable. To consider another
example, Title VII's proscription of discrimination is broader than the four-
teenth amendment's since the former includes unjustified discriminatory
effects while the latter includes only purposeful discrimination. 3 2 If different
constitutional and statutory definitions of prohibited discrimination may
coexist, then it. is perhaps no more anomalous for different constitutional
and statutory definitions of the permissible scope of voluntary affirmative
action to coexist. Of course, the former asymmetry of legal standards does
not produce asymmetrical results because Title VII's more stringent statutory
definition of prohibited discrimination has been extended to the public sector;
thus public and private employers alike are subject to the more demanding
standard of conduct.3a 3 By contrast, in the present setting the results are in
fact asymmetrical: because the constitutional standard for voluntary affir-
mative action is the more restrictive one, the public employer's freedom of
action is more limited than the private employer's.
proper initial inquiry in evaluating the legality of an affirmative action plan by a public employer
under Title VII is no different from that required by the Equal Protection Clause.") (arguing
for a prima fade case standard under Title VII rather than the Court's manifest imbalance
standard).
378. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1450 n.6 ("The fact that a public employer must also satisfy
the Constitution does not negate the fact that the statutory prohibition with which that employer
must contend was not intended to extend as far as that of the Constitution." (emphasis in
original)).
379. See supra note 104.
380. See supra text accompanying notes 146-48.
381. See supra text accompanying notes 353-57.
382. Compare Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (applying effects test under
Title VII) with Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252(1977) (applying purpose test under fourteenth amendment) and Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229 (1976) (applying purpose test under fifth amendment).
383. E.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328-29 (1977).
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However, the practical implications of this lack of symmetry are not
particularly troubling. The governmental unit wishing to engage in affir-
mative action must be a bit more precise and meticulous than the private
employer in articulating the justification for its actions. The governmental
unit must also be more ready to acknowledge its own history of prior
discrimination. If this leaves less room for hypocrisy or face-saving on the
part of the governmental employer, the gain in public understanding and
acceptance may outweigh the reduction, if any, in the allowable sweep of
affirmative action.
C. Policy Issues
Broadly speaking, the results of the Court's recent decisions are threefold.
First, the decisions recognize the values, as well as the costs, of affirmative
action and require that attention be paid to both. Second, they afford ample
room for the exercise of responsible discretion both by courts seeking to
remedy proven discrimination and by employers wishing to engage in vol-
untary affirmative action. Finally, the decisions avoid incorporating abso-
lutist or inflexible standards into the fabric of constitutional law.
Whether one applauds or deplores these results depends in significant part
on one's attitude toward the desirability of affirmative action. If one regards
a quota remedy even for a proven history of egregious, purposeful discrim-
ination as "evil," 384 one will naturally disapprove of the Court's recent
decisions. The same will be true if one is prepared to label all voluntary
affirmative action as politically motivated catering to "particular constitu-
encies," or as resigned acceptance under federal government pressure of
"the cost of hiring less qualified workers."38 5 My favorable evaluation of
the Court's recent decisions should be sufficient to suggest that I do not
share these negative views of affirmative action." 6
384. Firefighters, 106 S. Ct. at 3085 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also Weber, 443 U.S.
at 254-55 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("There is perhaps no device more destructive to the
notion of equality than ... the quota.... [It is] a creator of castes, a two-edged sword that
must demean one in order to prefer another.").
385. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1475-76 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Scalia, The Disease as
Cure: "In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race.", 1979 WASH.
U.L.Q. 147, 157 ("From racist principles flow racist results.").
386. Compare sources cited supra note 384 with Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and Pref-
erential Treatment: An Approach to the Topics, 24 UCLA L. REv. 581, 618 (1977). Professor
Wasserstrom states:
Whatever may be wrong with today's affirmative action programs and quota
systems, it should be clear that the evil, if any, is not the same [as the evil of
programs that discriminated against blacks and women]. Racial and sexual mi-
norities do not constitute the dominant social group. Nor is the conception of
who is a fully developed member of the moral and social community one of an
individual who is either female or black. Quotas which prefer women or blacks
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I will not attempt here to add to the extensive literature on the jurispru-
dential and philosophical theories for and against affirmative action. How-
ever, I will discuss the practicalities of the subject. My theoretical perspective
corresponds to what Professor Gewirtz has called the "corrective" conception
of antidiscrimination law. Under this conception, "[r]emedial strategies and
transformative actions are appropriate to remove the effects of past dis-
crimination. '3 87 I also share Professor Gewirtz's view that:
Law mediates between the ideal and the real .... To be of the law,
as opposed to philosophy and economic theory . . .. one must take
reality as the primary realm of activity. . . . In law, reality is not a
footnote to theory or an appendix to the ideal. . . . [L]aw is nothing
without reality, . . . law can and does pursue the ideal, and ... the
distinctive drama of legal life is that it requires living well with both.",
Of course, there is more than one conception of reality. Mine has been
shaped by many experiences representing the government and private plain-
tiffs in Title VII litigation. Many of the cases in which I was involved
resulted in the utilization of quota remedies. An early case will illustrate my
conception of the relevant reality.
After a full trial on the merits against a sheet metal union and joint
apprenticeship committee in Newark, New Jersey, the government moved
for a preliminary injunction to deal with two limited problems pending entry
of a final order in the case. The union had followed a practice of dispatching
young men to work as "temporary apprentices" or "seasonal help" before
the joint apprenticeship committee acted upon their applications. The men
referred out in this manner, all of whom were white and many of whom
had friends or relatives in the union, frequently worked as "temporary
apprentices" for many months before their formal applications were acted
upon. To preserve the court's ability to provide effective relief for minority
applicants in its final order, the government requested that no new appren-
do not add to the already relatively overabundant supply of resources and op-
portunities at the disposal of white males. If racial quotas are to be condemned
or if affirmative action programs are to be abandoned, it should be because they
will not work well to achieve the desired result. It is not because they seek either
to perpetuate an unjust society or to realize a corrupt ideal.
Id. Compare also sources cited supra note 385 with Wasserstrom, supra, at 619. Professor
Wasserstrom states:
Someone might argue that what is wrong with these programs is that they deprive
persons who are more qualified by bestowing benefits on those who are less
qualified in virtue of their being either black or female.
... Part of what is wrong with even talking about qualifications and merit is
that the argument derives some of its force from the erroneous notion that we
would have a meritocracy were it not for affirmative action.
Id. (footnote omitted).
387. Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition: School Desegregation and the Corrective Ideal, 86
COLUM. L. REv. 728, 734-35 (1986).
388. Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 587, 680-81 (1983).
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tices be indentured until the final order was issued. The government also
requested that, in the interim, any further referrals of seasonal help be on
the basis of one black or hispanic applicant referred for each one white
applicant referred. The court entered the one-for-one preliminary injunction
requested by the government. This order was included among those cited
by the Supreme Court in its recent Sheet Metal Workers case.38 9
The following is an excerpt from the hearing on the government's motion
for preliminary injunction. The case was heard by the late Judge Robert
Shaw, who, in chambers conferences with the attorneys for the parties, had
expressed his skepticism about quotas and pointedly informed us that if the
government was not satisfied with any order he entered in the case, there
was always the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
MR. SELiG [For the government]:... [There are not very many jobs
available at the moment for temporary apprentices.... I think that in
and of itself shows what the defendants have done, because the reason
there are no jobs available is that all the jobs have been taken by the
seventy or so whites who were put to work, half of them since the spring
of 1970, and one of the reasons for our motion is that the pipeline which
leads to apprenticeship has gotten clogged with a large group of whites,
and unless this injunction is entered it's going to be very difficult for
non-whites to get into this. . . . [Tihe defendants say that there were
only two jobs available since the conclusion of the trial. They have both
been filled by blacks, but I don't think that this obviates the necessity
for a preliminary injunction which is concerned (a) with preventing them
from indenturing a group of seventy white apprentices and then making
it impossible for any blacks to be indentured for the next year or perhaps
two years, and (b) with just arriving at an equitable procedure for
referring persons who seek work as temporary apprentices.
MR. PYKON [For the union and the joint apprenticeship committee]:...
[W]ithout prejudice, of course, ... we will certainly consent to the first
paragraph of counsel's proposed injunction which is that we will be
enjoined and restrained from engaging in any act or practice the purpose
or effect of which is to discriminate on account of race or national origin
against Negroes or Spanish-surnamed Americans. I would, like to even
amend that to say any person, which has been the union's position at
all times from the start of this trial, and I might add from the start of
the inception of this case it has been the union's position.
Tm CourT: Well, let's stay with the practical aspects of the matter. We
don't have any problem with discrimination against whites, so you can
eliminate your theoretical argument on that.
MR. PYKON: ... [Iln any event, to show what the union has been doing,
389. United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local Union No. 10, 3 Empl. Prac.
Dec. (CCH) 8068 (D.N.J. 1970) (preliminary injunction), cited in Local 28, Sheet Metal
Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019, 3047 n.41 (1986) (opinion of Brennan, J.).
See also id., 6 EmpI. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 8715 (D.N.J. 1973) (decision on merits); id. 8718
(D.N.J. 1973) (final order).
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since we were in court there were only two jobs and only Negroes were
considered. We thought we might show the good faith of the union....
Tim COURT: It might be just as well to correct the imbalance that presently
exists.
MR. PYIKON: I don't know what your Honor means or has in mind.
Tim COURT: Since over the years all the jobs have been given to white
people, it would seem in order to correct that imbalance let the black
people have some of them.
MR. PYJON: You mean racial discrimination in reverse?
Tim COURT: I told you before, counsel, that is an impractical approach.
Don't try to tell me that in employment there is discrimination against
white people. You know it is not so, and I know it is not so. Let's stick
with the problem that we have. Discrimination against black people, that
is what we want to correct.
MR. PYKON: That is right, your Honor, but-Well, I am saying the first
paragraph of counsel's order-his proposed order, is that we will not
take any act or practice which will have the purpose or effect to dis-
criminate on account of race or national origin.
Tm COURT: I can see if I let that stand alone without more specific
requirements every time a matter comes up I will have you arguing that
the action taken didn't affect them. I have had these situations where
generalities are present in orders. They actually settle nothing.
MR. PYI ON: I don't believe that the people should be referred on a one-
for-one basis, white against black. If that was the case, your Honor,
then since the time of the last hearing one less Negro would have been
working at this time because one white would have been submitted.
Tim COURT: Your only objection to Paragraph No. 3 is that you feel
No. 3 deprives black people of jobs?
MR. PYICON: I say this: If that test would have been in force at the time
of the last hearing that would be the practical effect. That is not my
entire argument, to phrase it in that manner. My argument is that they
should be referred out on some other criterion than just race. . . . That
is my objection.
Tim COURT: I think the only condition would be qualification for the
job.
MR. PYIKON: I would agree.
THE CoURT: And I am sure among the black people you have qualified
people, and I would be inclined to direct that there be a record of the
reasons for finding disqualification.
MR. PYKON: We have no objection to that.
TImE COURT: I am also of the opinion that until some [im]balance is
corrected the preference should be given to black people until we get
something near a fair ratio.
MR. SELIG: . . . [Y]our Honor, for this seasonal help there are no
qualifications that have been required in the past.
Tim CouRT: I know that. ... What do you have to say about this one
for one at the present time? It might take fifteen years before this
situation is even partially corrected.
MR. SELIG: Yes, your Honor. We would have no objection to going
farther than that. We just propose this as one way of doing it. If your
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Honor wishes to order that until there are the same-
TBm CouRT: Until the final decree. I am inclined to order that priority
be given minority groups until the final decree.
MR. SELIG: That would be fine with us.
Tim COURT: I will take out the one for one that you object to.
MR. PYKoN: I don't know what your Honor means by "priority." Does
this mean exclusively?
Tan CouRT: Yes.
MR. PYKON: Exclusively.
THE CouRT: Yes. You've only got three or four working out of seven
hundred.
MR. SELIG: This order is drawn on a fifty-fifty assumption. If what you
feel should be entered is one which is more stringent than that, I can
draft that this afternoon ....
THE COURT: Do nothing further. I will look at what you have. If I feel
that any changes should be made in it I will make the changes. . . . I
may accept your one-for-one proposition because even though there is
serious imbalance now the men likely to be employed, from what I have
heard, are young men, and I see no reason why there should not be
equal opportunity to all young men regardless of color. One for one is
a realistic approach, [though] I hope in some manner or other to correct
the present imbalance that exists. Maybe that can be done with a final
decree, but I will give this consideration. 3 0
Judge Shaw entered the one-for-one order shortly after this hearing. He,
like many other judges before and after him, had heard the evidence and
viewed the problem to be resolved in practical, nonideological terms. What
he searched for was a solution to the problem that was fair, equitable, and
even-handed, taking into account both the interests of the groups that had
been discriminated against and the interests of innocent third parties. He
approached his task with the benefit of a thorough, first-hand knowledge
of the facts and the parties, and with a keen understanding of what was
necessary to produce corrective results.
Judge Shaw, like scores of other federal district judges who have issued
quota orders over the years, was in a far better position to weigh the equities
and formulate a remedial decree than appellate judges with only a cold
record to review. A constricting standard of appellate review was not nec-
essary to assure that he would exercise his equitable remedial discretion in
a responsible fashion. He, like other district judges, could be counted upon
to approach his task with realism and with sensitivity. The objective and
the result of the quota he ordered was to remedy exclusion and to mandate
inclusion, not to exclude or to stigmatize any group or individual.
390. Transcript of Hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 2, 5, 7, 11-
12, 13, 15-16, 17-18, 28, United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local Union No.
10, C.A. No. 487-69 (D.N.J. Dec. 14, 1970) (copy on file at Indiana Law Journal office).
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It is true that with a finite number of jobs to be allocated, every additional
job for a minority applicant means one less job for a nonminority applicant.
But this reality is no reason to abandon the corrective endeavor or to abjure
meaningful remedies for proven wrongs. At the same time, any quota order
should be responsive to the factual record in the case. A reasoned explanation
should support the issuance of such an order and the extent and duration
of the numerical requirements. The order should not require employers to
hire unneeded or unqualified individuals, nor should it freeze nonminorities
out of all participation in future employment opportunities. Any quota
requirement must be subject to the availability of qualified minority appli-
cants, and the ratio ordered in a case involving airline pilots might well
differ from that in a case involving sheet metal workers. Federal district
judges may be relied upon to be aware of these limitations and considerations,
and they may be trusted to exercise their discretion sensibly in these cases.
The Court's recent decisions both recognize and insure that this will be so. 91
When one moves from the court order to the voluntary action context,
there is not quite the same basis for confidence that affirmative action will
be carefully formulated.392 That is why it is anomalous to apply a less
restrictive standard to voluntary action than to court orders.393 Nevertheless,
the fears of abuse articulated by some who are troubled by affirmative
action394 seem greatly exaggerated. The image of employers blithely filling
their workforces with incompetents because of the pressures to engage in
affirmative action seems far removed from reality. It is equally unrealistic
to assume that a scientific basis exists for choosing the "best qualified"
applicant for every job. In a footnote in Johnson, the Court said plainly
what everyone knows, but many opponents of affirmative action are loath
to acknowledge:
The dissent predicts that today's decision will loose a flood of "less
qualified" minorities and women upon the workforce . . . . A . . .
fundamental ... problem with the dissent's speculation is that it ignores
the fact that "[i]t is a standard tenet of personnel administration that
there is rarely a single, 'best qualified' person for a job. An effective
personnel system will bring before the selecting official several fully-
qualified candidates who each may possess different attributes which
recommend them for selection. Especially where the job is an unexcep-
tional, middle-level craft position, without the need for unique work
experience or educational attainment and for which several well-qualified
candidates are available, final determinations as to which candidate is
'best qualified' are at best subjective."3 95
391. See supra text accompanying notes 86-123, 143-95.
392. See, e.g., Days, supra note 140, at 458-60, 463-65, 471-76.
393. See supra text accompanying notes 146-48, 353-57.
394. See, e.g., Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1474-76 (Scalia, J. dissenting); Scalia, supra note 385,
at 148-57.
395. 107 S. Ct. at 1457 n.17 (citation omitted).
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This observation may fairly be made with regard to the vast majority of
jobs to which affirmative action will be applied. In those instances where
it is not accurate, weighty reasons of self-interest provide ample motivation
for the employer to select the best qualified applicant.
The idea that standardized tests or other credential requirements provide
a scientific basis for a purely meritocratic system may be seductive to some,
but it is belied by common sense and by the vast number of litigated cases
in which the unfairness and limited utility of many widely used selection
devices have been documented.396 In one such case the court made the
following trenchant observation:
[I]t is apparent that no applicant for public employment can base any
claim of right . . . upon an eligibility ranking which results from un-
validated selection procedures that have been shown to disqualify blacks
at a disproportionate rate. This is so because by definition such criteria
have not been shown to be predictive of successful job performance.
Hence, there is no reliable way to know that any accepted applicant is
truly better qualified than others who have been rejected. Until the
selection procedures used by the defendants here have been properly
validated, it is illogical to argue that quota hiring produces unconstitu-
tional "reverse" discrimination, or a lowering of employment standards,
or the appointment of less or unqualified persons.m
Common experience tells us that the situation this observation describes is
the rule rather than the exception, both in the private and in the public
sector.
This is not to suggest that qualifications are irrelevant or that, even though
relevant, they should not be taken into account. But there is no question
that mistakes will occur and that individual injustices will be perpetrated
when employment decisions are made, whether or not affirmative action is
a factor that enters into the equation. It would be unrealistic, ahistorical,
and insensitive to the lingering effects of past discrimination to demand that
the positive values of affirmative action be scrapped in favor of a meritocratic
ideal which we lack the means to achieve. Recognizing this, the Court's
recent decisions seek to provide a reasonable degree of flexibility for affir-
mative action that is responsive to social and historical realities.
At the same time, the Court has properly recognized that competing values
and interests exist in this area and are entitled to weight. Hence, the Court
has insisted that the burdens of affirmative action on nonminorities not be
excessive; that preferential remedies not be employed "indiscriminate[ly];" 391
that voluntary affirmative action not degenerate to "blind hiring by the
396. E.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Griggs, 401 U.S. 424.
397. NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614, 618 (5th Cir. 1974).
398. Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019, 3057 (1986)
(Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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numbers; ' ' 399 and that the justification for an affirmative action plan not
be so attenuated or amorphous as to lead to "remedies that are ageless in
their reach into the past, and timeless in their ability to affect the future.'"'4
The Court's approach to affirmative action has been careful and cognizant
of the dangers of excess. But the Court has wisely avoided locking itself,
the federal judiciary, or the nation's employers into a constitutional straight-
jacket.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decisions on affirmative action in employment have
settled the most important statutory and constitutional questions. Although
the Court has been closely divided, respect for stare decisis counsels adherence
to the principles which have been established. The decisions the Court has
reached reflect a laborious and conscientious effort over an extended period
of time. Whatever his or her personal views might be, a new justice will
not write on a clean slate. In this area of the law of affirmative action, a
new justice could find ample reason to preserve the legacy of a Supreme
Court majority.
399. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1454.
400. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1848 (opinion of Powell, J.).
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